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I. INTRODUCTION
The creation of international commercial law presents an interesting
paradox for proponents of sovereignty in international law. Indeed, it
could be argued that the creation of international commercial law is the
vanishing point of sovereignty in that nation states are becoming
increasingly less important in the creation of international commercial
law with the growth of regional organizations, non-state actors, and
international arbitration. This is spurred on by the march of globalization
and the consequent need for international commercial law. The term
"harmonization" will be used as a surrogate to discuss the creation of
international commercial law, as it is the primary means by which
international commercial law is created. This article seeks to chart this
trend and show that nation states are being marginalized and will
become significantly less relevant as more and more international legal
instruments are created. In Part II, I paint the landscape against which
the process is evolving; in Part III, I will demonstrate the growing role of
regional endeavors at harmonization; and in Part IV, I will attempt to
draw broad themes that establish that nation states will increasingly have
a secondary role in the creation of international commercial law.
II. THE LANDSCAPE
The end of the cold war and the corresponding explosion of commerce
between nations have provided an impetus to internationalism in the law
that has never previously been seen in human history. There is more
curiosity about the different solutions offered by the various national
laws to the common problems of international commerce than ever
before.' A simple testament to this curiosity and spirit of
1. RoY GOODE, COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEXT MILLENNIUM 88 (London 1998)
(noting that there is "an increasing movement away from" domestic international trade
law to what has become' known as "transnational commercial law"). According to
Professor Goode, this is that body of law that "results from the harmonization or
convergence of national laws, whether by international conventions, conscious or
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internationalism is the proliferation in efforts to harmonize the law that
2
are currently in pro ress in areas as diverse as civil procedure,
receivables financing, space asset financing,4 and insolvency law.5
More and more areas of the law are falling under the harmonizing lens.
Only a decade ago, it would have been imaginable that it would ever be
possible to have international conventions in areas under the remit of
property law or civil procedure.6 This was the product of a belief that
these areas of the law embody aspects of national socio-political history
and culture, and that national sensibilities may be so strong as to render
any attempt at harmonization unsuccessful. 7 That belief has given way
today. Aspects of property law are being attacked with great vigor and
unconscious judicial parallelism, uniform rules .... Professor Goode first defined the
term in his article Usage and its Reception in Transnational Commercial Law, 46 INT'L
& COMP. L.Q. 1, 2 (1997):
'Transnational commercial law' [which] is conceived as law which is not
particular to or the product of any one legal system but represents a
convergence of rules drawn from several legal systems or even, in the view of
its more expansive exponents, a collection of rules which are entirely anational
and have their force by virtue of international usage and its observance by the
merchant community. In other words, it is the rules, not merely the actions or
events, that cross national boundaries.
See also Roy Goode, Insularity or Leadership? The Role of the United Kingdom in the
Harmonization of Commercial Law, 50 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 751 (2001).
2. The American Law Institute and UNIDROIT are working on drafting
procedural rules that a country may adopt for the adjudication of disputes stemming from
international commercial transactions. See The American Law Institute, Principles and
Rules of Transnational Civil Procedure, Discussion Draft No. 4 (Apr. 18, 2003).
3. See The U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL),
Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG. I I/WP.87 (2001), available at http://www.uncitral.org/stable/res568l -e.pdf.
4. UNIDROIT is currently in the advanced stages of transmitting a draft Space
Protocol to the Cape Town Convention of 2001. See The International Institute for the
Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), The Convention on International Interests in
Mobile Equipment, available at http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/Reports/Unidroit
SpaceprotO I 02.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
5. See U.N. Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), UNCITRAL
Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, UNCITRAL, 48th
Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/48/17 (1997).
6. See Ronald Cuming, The Internationalization of Secured Financing Law: the
Spreading Influence of the Concepts of UCC, Art 9 and its Progeny, in MAKING
COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF RoY GOODE 499 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997)
(commenting that "[s]ecured financing law has traditionally been viewed as an area
which is ill suited to internationalization.").
7. Cf American Law Institute, supra note 2; Principles of Transnational Civil
Procedure. See also Harold Burman, Ten Years of the United Nations Sales Convention:
Building on the CISG: International Commercial Law Developments and Trends for the
2000's, 17 J.L. & CoM. 355, 357 (1998) (arguing about insolvency law as well).
international instruments are rapidly being honed. The Cape Town
Convention of 2001 is one instance. 8  Yet another is the recently
concluded Hague Convention on conflict rules in respect of securities
held by intermediaries. 9
This level of activity is but a reflection of a greater need for
international commercial law. For decades despite lofty ambitions there
was nothing but paralysis. One instance of this can be seen in the case
of the grand idea of craftinf principles of international contract law. The
Secretariat of UN1DROIT 0 presented such an idea for the drafting of
general principles of international contract law in its Report to
UNCITRAL" on the "Progressive Codification of the Law of
International Trade" as far back as 1971.2 The Secretariat's ambition
was as magnificent as it was unattainable:
[I]nternational trade needs its own ordinary law with its own particular role and
full range of functions.... The very fact that the legal relationships of
international trade are international in character puts them outside the
jurisdiction of municipal law and makes them governable by a law removed
from any national contingencies, that is, an ordinary law of international trade,
which alone can provide the legal framework which international trade needs in
order to develop. .. . Consequently, international trade now, as much as ever,
needs ... a material law that can govern international relations .... It would be
unthinkable... to allow international trade to continue to be governed by a host
of national laws, since that places it in an impossible position, or to leave all
legal problems arising in international trade to be solved simply by practice...
so the first task will be to prepare a draft for the general section containing the
basic princiles which will form the foundations and the framework of the
This was to remain a pipe dream until the emergence of the UNIDROIT
Principles on International Commercial Contracts, and the now raging
8. International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT), supra
note 4 (signed by 26 nations as of June 2003).
9. Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Certain Rights in respect of
Securities held with an Intermediary, 2002, available at http://www.hcch.net/e/
conventions/menu36e.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
10. The International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (UNIDROIT) is
an inter-governmental agency with headquarters in Rome, Italy.
11. UNITED NATIONS, UNCITRAL THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW 3 (1986).
12. UNCITRAL, Progressive Codification of the Law of International Trade: Note
by the Secretariat of the International Institute of the Unification of Private Law(UNIDROIT), 1968-70 Y.B. of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law 285, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1970.
13. Id. at 286 (stating that the first task was to prepare a draft for the general
section containing the basic principles that would form the foundations and the
framework of the unification effort). The Report called for a combined effort from all
institutions such as UNIDROIT, UNCITRAL, and UNCTAD, and emphasized the
impelling need for developing principles and rules of international contract law which
could serve as a reference point for the construction of contracts and international
conventions without recourse to domestic laws.
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debate on the European Civil Code.
Similarly, when UNCITRAL asked Professor Ulrich Drobnig of the
Max Planck-Institute to prepare a study on the legal principles governing
security interests in the various legal systems of the world 4 with a view
to determining whether it would be possible to harmonize the law in that
area, there was very little room for optimism.
After analyzing the law of nineteen nations, the study found that the
differences in the treatment of secured credit were great.' 5 Thereafter,
the report tried to make assessments to "help to consider the necessity or
desirability of framing rules in this field on an international level,
especially for the international movement of goods subject to security
interests.'" 16 Despite the vast differences in national laws, Drobnig was
not optimistic about the possibility of creating a convention:
It would seem that international legislation in the form of a convention
providing uniform rules of substantive and conflicts law is not appropriate in
this case. As against international sales or international transportation or the
international circulation of negotiable instruments, transnational incidence of
security interests is as yet relatively moderate. It would probably be difficult to
obtain sufficient government support for an international conference dealing
with the relatively technical topic of security interests; and even if the text of an
international instrument could be agreed upon, national parliaments would
probably be slow and perhaps even reluctant to ratify such a text.
17
14. See UNCITRAL, Report of the Secretary-General: Study on Security Interests,
[1977] 8 Y.B. UNCITRAL 171, 173, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A.
15. Id.
16. Id. As part of these assessments, Professor Drobnig chronicled prior attempts
to achieve some degree of international uniformity with respect to security interests.
These attempts included: (1) a uniform conditional sales act enacted by three
Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, and Denmark) during 1915-1917; (2) the
UNIDROIT draft provisions of 1939 and 1951 concerning the impact of reservation of
title in the sale of certain goods; (3) provisions in the draft European Economic
Community Bankruptcy Convention of 1970 regarding the effect in bankruptcy of
reservation of title in the sale of goods; and (4) model reservation of title clauses
contained in several "General Conditions" elaborated by the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe. See id. at 210-11.
17. Report of the Secretary-General: Study on Security Interests, para. 4.2.1, at
218 U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/131 (1997), reprinted in [1997] 8 Y.B. INT'L TRADE L. 171, 218,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/SER.A/1977. This was despite the fact that there were proposals for
the harmonization of secured credit law that had been submitted to the Council of
Europe, made by UNIDROIT in 1968, and by the Service de recherches juridiques
comparatives of the Centre National Recherche Scientifique of Paris in 1972. These
proposals put forth a range of possible unification efforts, including that of creating a
uniform security interest for international cases. Professor Drobnig noted the existence
of a proposal to the European Community for the establishment of a central register for
security interests. Professor Drobnig also took a negative view towards developing
Drobnig's words would prove prophetic at least with respect to Model
Laws: "Perhaps moral persuasion or intellectual insight into the virtues
of the model rules will move some States to adopt them. Others may
need persuasion by more effective means such as insistence on the part
of international financing institutions."'' 8 The imperatives of modern
international commerce have in fact pushed these very areas of the law,
once thought to be beyond the pale of harmonization, to the very
forefront.
A. The Nature of Harmonization
This section deals with the nature and characteristics of the
harmonization of international commercial law. It is clear that there is a
distinct difference between harmonization endeavors that have followed
the end of the cold war and those that occurred during or before its
advent. This paper is not overly concerned with harmonization endeavors
during and prior to the Cold War, except in so far as they hold lessons
for current efforts. 19 The reasons for dispensing with a detailed study of
harmonization endeavors during and prior to the Cold War are twofold:
1. Much of the debate that characterized scholarship at the time was
organized along ideological lines which have no relevance today; and 2.
The extent of globalization that characterizes the modern world makes
many of the concerns of the cold war era redundant.
Perhaps the most important aspect of modern life is the idea that we
live in a "global village." Although Professor Berger argues that
"globalization" is an abstract term that has become a clich6 rather than
an idea with substantive content, he concedes that it has resulted in the
"denationalization of the legal process." 20 He argues that because of the
geopolitical and economic aspects of globalization at the beginning of
the twenty-first century, associated with the decreasing significance of
territoriality and the springing up of a "global civil society," a
decentralized approach to law-making has become acceptable and even
opens the door for the acceptance of the lex mercatoria as an
recommendations for nations to adopt rules that would promote uniformity. "Mere
recommendations, even if emanating from an international organization of the highest
repute, will not command sufficient moral or other support for adoption by any sizable
number of States." Id. at para. 4.2.3.
18. Id. at para. 4.2.2.
19. One instrument which may hold such lessons is the Convention for the
International Sale of Goods, 1980, a prize horse of the UNCITRAL stable that has been
ratified by sixty-two countries as of June 2003.
20. Klaus Peter Berger, The New Law Merchant and the Global Market: A 21st
Century View of Transnational Commercial Law, INT. A.L.R. 3(4), 91, 98 (2000).
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autonomous legal order in international commerce. E1 DiMatteo writes
that "at the end of the twentieth century, globalization and the volume of
international transactions have led to the idea of a new lex mercatoria,22
in no small measure because the continued development of international
trade requires the internationalization of commercial law. Even if we do
not accept the idea of a lex mercatoria, new or otherwise, it is
impossible to deny that there is a great impetus to create international
commercial law instruments. This is primarily because insularity is no
longer possible as contacts with legal systems that are foreign are more
common today than ever before.23 Further, international commercial law
making is no longer the sole preserve of nation states. Coevally, because
of the similarity of transactions encountered across the legal system,
problems encountered by lawyers in different countries are likely to have
many similarities. One example is financing of aircraft. Regardless of
the airline involved, its lawyers will have to answer questions about
registration requirements, the recording of security interests in the
aircraft and its engines and the form that the transaction should take,
among other things.24 Similarly, creditors, regardless of the country they
are from, are concerned primarily with the question as to how their
interests can be protected in the event the debtor defaults in making
payment. 25 This commonality of questions may provide the impetus for
21. Id. at 100.
22. Larry A. DiMatteo, Reviewing the Historical and Practical Significance of the
Principles of European Contract Law, 43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 569, 570 (2002).
23. Westbrook writes that "more and more cases in United States bankruptcy
courts have an important foreign element-a resident alien debtor with assets in the old
country, or perhaps a foreign lender or a bondholder unfamiliar with [the American law
on bankruptcy]." Jay Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 563 (1996).
24. Thatcher Stone, In Flight Between Geneva and Rome: Abandoning Choice of
Law Systems for Substantive Legal Principles in International Aircraft Finance, 20 U.
PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 487, 490 (1999).
25. Claps and McDonnell cite an Asian Development Bank Study which shows the
following:
private creditors in all countries-common law and civil law, industrial and
transitional, north and south-worry primarily about [repayment] ... when the
debtor offers collateral for a loan, private creditors offer larger loans, at lower
interest rates, payable over longer periods of time. Compared to a debtor who
cannot offer good collateral, one with such collateral can anticipate receiving
six to eight times more credit, taking two to ten times longer for repayment,
and paying interest rates 30 percent to 50 percent lower.
See Guillermo A. Moglia Claps & Julian B. McDonnell, Secured Credit and Insolvency
Law in Argentina and the U.S.: Gaining Insight From a Comparative Perspective, 30
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 393, n.19 (2002).
the pursuit of common solutions.
The move towards a global village brings with it several problems
both for lawyers and legal systems. The former have to familiarize
themselves with a vast array of legal systems to determine the legal
position for issues raised by any given. international transaction, while
the latter have to evolve solutions for problems of an international
nature. This is particularly difficult if the legal system in question has
not encountered situations involving certain concepts before. One
instance of this is the treatment of secured credit. Legal systems have
widely varying attitudes towards secured credit. Even amongst those
nations that have detailed secured credit laws, there are significant
differences in the approach of civil law countries from that of the United
States and even amongst each other.26 Even in the European Union a
recent study found that some security instruments for movable assets are
unknown in some Member States and that in such cases the security
interest fails if the secured goods are transferred across borders.27 The
study gave the example of the problems posed by the transfer of
movable goods from Germany to Austria, and noted that the difficulties
negatively affect the possibility of entering into cross-border leasing
contracts.2
The legal systems in developing countries do not have an adequate
legal regime in place, and frequently do not accord enough importance
to secured transactions law. 29 This may be explained in part by the fact
that unfamiliarity with modern financing techniques has resulted in a
lack of appreciation of the benefits of good secured credit laws. While
this continues, parties from these countries are unable to derive the full
benefits of globalization, hamstrung as they are by the underdevelopment of
their legal systems. This asymmetry in participation is a serious
problem, and one that can easily be corrected by harmonization. The
sheer extent and potential volume of international trade justifies the
investment in harmonization for these countries.
1. Harmonization Defined
While it is possible to get an intuitive idea as to nature of
harmonization in the commercial law area, it may be useful to consider
26. Neil Cohen, Internationalizing the Law of Secured Credit: Perspectives from
the U.S. Experience, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 423,431 (1999).
27. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the
Commission to the Council: A More Coherent European Contract Law: An Action Plan,
COM(03)89, p. 13, 12th February, 2003, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm./consumers/
policy/developments/contract-law/com_2003_68_en.pdf (last visited Jan. 31, 2004).
28. Id.
29. Cohen, supra note 26, at 432.
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some definitions. Ziegel writes that "Harmonization in this field of law
is a word with considerable elasticity. In its most complete sense it
means absolute uniformity of legislation among the adopting
jurisdictions., 30 According to Leebron, "Harmonization can be loosely
defined as making the regulatory requirements or government policies of
different jurisdictions identical or at least more similar."31
Harmonization has also been described as an attempt to reduce the
differences among national laws.32 Glenn writes that the harmonization
process is an evolutionary process that results in ever "greater levels of
uniformity and correspondingly greater levels of supranational
governance." 33 According to Zamora,
Harmonization does not entail the adoption of a single, model set of rules, but
instead implies a wide range of ways in which differences in legal concepts in
different jurisdictions are accommodated. This accommodation can take place
in many ways: by a process of law reform in one or more countries, reflecting
influences beyond the jurisdiction's borders; by the mediation of private law
concepts adopted by parties caught between two legal systems; or by a myriad
of other contact points between legal regimes, from academic writings, the
conceits of law professors, to visits by government officials to neighboring
countries. 34
In his opinion, "harmonization should not be confused with unification of
laws, or with the "imposition of one legal model on all jurisdictions." 35
30. Jacob Ziegel, Harmonization of Private Laws in Federal Systems of
Government: Canada, the USA, and Australia, in MAKING COMMERCIAL LAW: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF ROY GOODE 133 (Ross Cranston ed., 1997).
31. David Leebron, Claims for Harmonization: A Theoretical Framework, 27
CAN. Bus. L.J. 63, 667 (1996). He also argues "the term 'harmonization' is something of
a misnomer insofar as it might be regarded as deriving from the musical notion of
harmony, for it is difference, not sameness, that makes for musical harmony." Id. at 67.
32. American Law Institute, supra note 2.
33. H. Patrick Glenn, Harmony of Laws in the Americas, 34 U. MIAMI INTER-AM.
L. REV. 223, 246 (2003).
34. Stephen Zamora, NAFTA And The Harmonization Of Domestic Legal Systems:
The Side Effects Of Free Trade, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 401, 403 (1995).
According to Zamora,
the harmonization of law in an inter-jurisdictional and international transaction
context is value neutral and cannot be justified in and of itself ....
Harmonization of any legal domain particularly from legislative reform
requires specific justification as to the desirability of harmonization and model
upon which it is based. The justification cannot be found in any attribute of
harmonization. [Due to the] increasing contacts between citizens of different
countries, the trend towards harmonization and accommodation of legal
differences is likely to continue.
Id. at 404-05.
35. Id.
For Professor Boodman, "in a legal context harmonization is merely
synonymous with the process of problem solving and is as infinite in its
configurations as are potential problems in law. 36  According to
Professor Goode, harmonization has two quite distinct purposes:
[t]he first is to create a special regime for international transactions while
retaining national laws for purely domestic transactions... [tihe second is to
facilitate a common market or political or economic grouping by harmonizing
the national laws governing domestic trafactions, so that state boundaries" do
not affect commerce within the grouping.
Thus he draws a distinction between endeavors like the Vienna
Convention and the EEC Directive on Consumer Credit, based on their
motivations.
While each of these definitions is debatable, it will suffice for the
purposes of this paper to formulate a working definition of harmonization in
the field of commercial law: any attempt, by whatever instrument
(international convention, model laws, restatements, model contracts,
standard form contracts, codes of practice, or usages) to minimize or
eliminate discord between national commercial laws as they apply to
international commercial transactions. That is the operating definition
for this paper and must be borne in mind as the analysis progresses.
2. Historical Context
Harmonization is not a new invention. Perhaps the clearest examples
of formal harmonization in modern legal history have been the European38
national codifications of the 19th and 20th centuries. These attempts
may be better categorized as unification. 39 Thereafter, the growth of
nationalism and the corresponding nationalization of law in Europe
accentuated European diversity. National laws emerged in many
languages and different forms. Germanic codes were different from the
codes of the other countries.4 0 The civil and common laws grew side-
36. Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws; 39 AM. J. COMP. L.
699, 707 (1991).
37. Roy Goode, Reflections of the Harmonisation of Commercial Law, in
COMMERCIAL AND CONSUMER LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS 3 (Ross
Cranston & Roy Goode eds., 1993).
38. Glenn, supra note 33, at 223. Daniel Berkowitz, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM.
J. COMP. L. 163, 174 (2003). The French pioneered the "first comprehensive national
civil, commercial and criminal codes between 1804 and 1811. The [Napoleonic] codes
consolidated legislation operating before the French revolution and codified existing
business practice in [a systematic manner]." Id. at 173. Glenn points out that "[t]he
other major codification of the nineteenth century is the German civil code ... which
had been preceded by commercial, criminal, civil and criminal procedure codes .... Id.
39. Id. at 225.
40. Berkowitz, supra note 38, at 173.
[VOL. 5: 267, 2004] The Creation of International Commercial Law
SAN DIEGO INT'L L.
by-side and diverged to such an extent that the differences were seen as
barriers that were as tangible as physical, national boundaries. While this
may have been a mere European problem, and hence of little importance
to the rest of the world, the impact of colonialism meant that the world's
legal systems were divided along civil law and common law lines.
Colonialism brought about a peculiar kind of harmonization with the
colony acquiring laws based on those enacted in the mother country. "In
the nineteenth century, French law was diffused through all continents"
because of France's colonies.41 Likewise, English law dominated North
America, Asia, Australia, and parts of Africa. It is true to say that most
countries derived their current formal legal order from Europe during the
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century. Despite the death of
colonialism and the independence of the former colonies, most countries
continue to retain the core characteristics of the legal system they had
received from the colonizers. One notable exception is that of the U.S.
where the law has broken free of English law.42
Harmonization under colonialism is not to be confused with modem
notions of harmonization which are based on respect for all legal
systems. Colonial harmonization disregarded indigenous legal systems
and imposed the colonizers' law against the consent of the local
populace.43 This kind of harmonization in many cases crept into the
colonies slowly: at first the transplanted European law applied only to
the European population, while local people continued to be governed
by local laws and customs. Criminal, tax, and administrative law was
applied to the locals but in family, inheritance, and also commercial
matters amongst themselves, local law prevailed. This was the practice
in many English colonies, including India, and the jurisdiction of
common law courts was only extended over time.44 This brief historical
context only serves to distinguish modem harmonization from its
colonial counterpart, and to free it of any political taint. In the modem
41. Rodolfo Sacco, One Hundred Years of Comparative Law, 75 TUL. L. REV.
1159, 1161 (2001).
42. Berkowitz, supra note 38, at 174.
43. Legal systems that were well developed included Hindu law, Islamic law and
Chinese law.
44. It was only after the British government took over control from the East India
Company in 1858 that the general jurisdiction of the common law established. Courts
were created with the Privy Council as the highest court of resort. English common law
was also codified which greatly accelerated the application of the common law to India
and later to other parts of the empire.
era, there is vigorous participation in the creation of international
commercial law from all countries, and in many cases, such participation
offers the opportunity to get rid of colonial laws.
B. Arguments for the Creation of International Commercial Law
Although it may seem that harmonization has innate intuitive virtues,
it is important to understand the arguments advanced by its proponents.
There is no consensus that indicates overwhelming appeal, and each
argument must be individually examined and evaluated. This paper
contents itself with a brief outline of the main arguments.
1. Divergent National Laws Cause Problems
Some scholars have argued that the mere existence of different
national laws is a reason to engage in the harmonization process.45
According to Ansel, "the disparity of national laws is contrary to the
requirements of [the] modern economy and inimical to the development
of international relations; a uniform law is superior to a system
of conflicts of law, which allows the existence of those specific
differences on which it is based. 46 He equates the diversity in national
laws to diversity of local customs within a single country, and argues
that it is undesirable because it "compromises the soundness, the general
value, and the supremacy of the law. 47  In his view, this diversity
provokes stress, the elimination of which must be the aim. It is hard to
agree with this extreme view.
Professor Stephan points out that divergences in national laws may
cause "legal risk.''48  In his view, such legal risk can encourage
opportunism by commercial parties who may, for instance, race to
litigate in a forum that will suit their interests in case something goes
wrong with the transaction.49 One of the pitfalls of the existence of
"legal risk" is that at the dividing line between risky and non-risky
transactions, many parties may desist from commercial activity.5 °
Accordingly, there may be merit in reducing "legal risk" to foster
commerce.
45. Marc Ansel, From the Unification of Law to its Harmonization, 51 TUL. L.
REV. 108 (1976).
46. Id.
47. Id. at I10.
48. Paul Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in
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Mere diversity in national laws is no reason to create international
commercial law. National laws are founded on different policy assumptions
and there is no reason to eliminate differences that stem therefrom unless
they impede international commerce. Where differences in national
commercial laws are an impediment, harmonization can help create an
"interface" that helps parties across the divide transact business.52 In
situations where differences in national laws are not material to the
conduct of international commerce, there is little reason to create
uniform law. It is important to emphasize this-in the absence of strong
reason uniform laws stand very little chance of adoption and will result
in wasted resources. Uniformity has very little innate value in this area.
Uniformity has appeal only insofar as it eliminates or minimizes hurdles
caused by disparity.
That divergent national laws can be an impediment to international
commerce was well demonstrated in the European context by the
European Commission's consultation exercise, undertaken in 2001.53
The joint response prepared by the Commission on European Contract
Law (CECL), and the Study Group on European Civil Code (hereinafter
referred to as the "Joint Response"), as expert a body on the state of
European law as is likely to be found anywhere, painted a picture of the
difficulties posed even in a small economic region by disparities in the
law. The Joint Response was clear about the fact that there was
diversity: "Contract laws across the EU show significant diversity on
many fundamental points. Businesses cannot safely trade under the
private law of another Member State in the supposition that it will be
similarly to their own. The impossibility within reasonable conditions
for participants in the internal market to acquire essential knowledge
about foreign law always entails the danger of substantial loss of claims
or unsuspected liabilities. 54
They opined that differences between the contract laws of the Member
States can have negative repercussions for participants in the internal
market in at least four ways. First, they thought that differences
effectively prevent certain kinds of commercial activity in the European
52. See Leebron, supra note 31, at 75.
53. Dr. Ole Lando & Dr. Christian v. Bar, Communication on European Contract
Law: Joint Response of the Commission on European Contract Law and the Study
Group on a European Civil Code, at v, available at http://www.sgecc.net/media/
download/stellungnahme kommission_5_finall.pdf (Oct. 25, 2001).
54. Id. at 9.
market. Second, the Joint Response pointed out that the differences
impose additional costs because of the need to find out about foreign
law. These costs are either borne by businesses or, where possible are
passed on to consumers. If the costs are very great, a business may
decide that it would not be worth entering into international deals and
may choose to forego otherwise profitable economic activity. This can
also adversely affect competition in the common market. Third, the
differences may mean that legal relationships are entered into without a
proper understanding of the legal consequences. They point out that
businesses do not always take into account the many peculiarities of
foreign contract law, and are taken by surprise when rules of private
international law come into play.55 Fourth, the fear of adverse legal
consequences in a foreign country may motivate businesses to not risk
international trade. This may apply with great force to deter small or
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) which cannot bear the legal costs.
The Joint Response points out that in view of the many profound
differences between the contract laws in the Member States such a
concern can often be justified. Even if the fear is unfounded, it can still
deter businesses from engaging in trade.56 Further, in their experience,
[I]t is difficult and often impractical for parties entering into agreements or
already bound by contracts to obtain cost-effective information about foreign
law relevant to rights and liabilities under transactions they are contemplating or
have entered into. The problems are particularly acute in the area of the law of
obligations and property law because even in many of the legal systems where
this area of the law has been codified the legislation is relatively old and its
meaning cannot be established without grasping the significance of much
judicial interpretation of its provisions. In relative terms the law is less apparent
and more difficult to ascertain with assurance of its correctness.
57
They concluded that there were "substantial increases in costs for
market participants" that spring from "the diversity both of mandatory
contract law rules ... and of dispositive contract law rules."58 The
parties also stood to incur additional costs if a legal dispute arose
requiring them to resort to the courts. In the opinion of the authors,
litigation in cases that invoke foreign law is particularly expensive as
foreign legal opinion has to be obtained, witnesses may have to be
55. "This difficulty in finding essential information about foreign law on a cost-
effective basis creates the very real danger that participants in the European market will
trade on the basis of false assumptions as to their legal position or be dissuaded from
commercial activity because of the legal uncertainties involved." Id.
56. "The fact that substantially the same legal wine may be found in different
shaped bottles as business activity moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction is not enough
to create the right environment for business in a continental market; apparent differences
can be as damaging to confidence as real ones." Id. at 6.
57. Id. at9.
58. Id. at 10.
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prepared, etc. Although the authors did not undertake any empirical
study to assess the magnitude of any of these costs, they felt that it was a
safe assumption, supported by anecdotal evidence, that significant costs
are incurred in these situations. Furthermore, they also believed that
private international law does not ameliorate that problem.
The Joint Response also addressed the diversity of legal regimes that
arises when some Member States sign an international convention when
others do not. As is obvious, this results in harmonization for the signatory
countries, but as regards the non-signatories, within the European Union
it results in fresh legal diversity. The answer is simple-the non-
signatories can accede to the convention, or the European Union as a
whole can enter into the convention. The authors wanted a coordinated
approach of the international policy of Member States in signing, ratifying
and implementing international agreements unifying private law, and
thought that Member States should sign such conventions en bloc. One
example of this is article 3 of Council Decision of February 19, 2002,
authorizing Member States, in the interest of the Community to sign or
ratify the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil
Pollution Damage, 2001. This is an approach that has great merit and
would also be welcomed whole-heartedly by the harmonizing agencies
as it would improve the process of ratification and harvest more
signatories.
In contrast to their counterparts in America, the authors were
convinced that "divergent contract law makes it impossible to engage
effectively" in Europe and that businesses which do so "are often
burdened by costs which are either superfluous or unforeseeable."
Further, "risks of liability are extraordinarily difficult to gauge; often
they are simply absorbed and may make business unprofitable or loss-
making. ' 59 From the Joint Response one gets the impression that very
little trade happens because of these problems. However, this is not so,
as proven by the sheer magnitude of trade in the European Union. The
correct interpretation is perhaps that trade is conducted despite these
great differences between the laws, and by incurring the costs that such
differences impose. The elimination of these costs will probably reduce
legal costs and improve profit margins. It is unclear from the European
Commission's consultation exercise if the respondents were objecting to
the differences in mandatory rules of contract law, or contract law as a
59. Id. at 14.
whole. If they were only objecting to differences in mandatory rules, and
problems created thereby, it would be sensible to tailor harmonization
more narrowly.
2. National Laws May be Inadequate for International Transactions
There are situations in which national laws do not meet the demands
of international commerce. This is not so much because of differences
in solutions afforded by the different national laws that may come into
play in relation to any given transaction as it is due to the innate
limitations of national laws as they apply to international transactions.6 °
As Rene David colorfully put it, "the use of domestic tools to solve
questions that are essentially international 'is to square the circle. ' ' 61
One glaring instance of this is the area of security interests in mobile
equipment. Because of its very nature, mobile equipment will not be
confined to any one jurisdiction, and it would be difficult, if not
impossible to keep track of the various security interests these items may
be subject to in the absence of an international register that records these
interests. No single national law can create such an international
register. In the absence of such an international register, parties will be
forced to conduct searches in various national registries (where they
exist) to determine issues of priority, and even then may not be
adequately protected. This is a clear example of the need for an
international solution.
3. Modernization and Facilitation of International Trade
This has been a function of harmonization that has long been
neglected. UNCITRAL was founded in 1966 with a mandate to further
the harmonization of the law of international trade, motivated by:
60. To quote the colorful words of Professor Goode, "The time has long passed
when domestic legislation shaped for internal trade can provide sensible solutions to the
problems of internal commerce ... there may be substantial advantages in uniform law
within a restricted field. The parties are able to sing from the same hymn sheet, to
become familiar with the text, to read it in their own language, and to reduce their
dependency on local experts in every jurisdiction in which they transact business."
Goode, Insularity or Leadership? The Role of the United Kingdom in the Harmonization
of Commercial Law, supra note I, at 752.
61. Rene David, The International Unification of Private Law, in 2 INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7 (1969) (cited in Friedrich Juenger, Conflict of
Laws, Comparative Law and Civil Law: The Lex Mercatoria and Private International
Law, 60 LA. L. REV. 1133, 1139 (2000)). Juenger also quotes Uruguayan private
international law scholar Quint Alfons, who believed that the domestic law of a state is
designed to serve the needs of its society and cannot be applied in international
transactions.
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[T]he belief that the progressive harmonization and unification of international
trade law, in reducing or removing legal obstacles to the flow of international
trade, especially those affecting the developing countries, would contribute
significantly to universal economic cooperation among all States on a basis of
equality, equity and common interest and to the elimination of discrimination in
international trade and, thereby, to the well-being of all peoples.
62
Despite this mandate, modernization had not assumed the importance it
should have due to the paralysis of the Cold War years. However, in the
current global environment, this is a very powerful motivation for
harmonization. This is especially true for countries that are moving
from planned or mixed economies to a free market economy. Such a
movement inevitably requires legal reform to facilitate free enterprise.
While these nations may see the need to reform their laws, that may be
easier said than done due to the absence of expertise of law as it works
in a free market. One way out of this conundrum might be to copy the
laws of a country or countries that have a free market.
This is indeed a common practice. Legislators very frequently and
unwittingly bring about harmonization through the process of copying.
Drafters in various countries examine legislation in other countries and
seek to implement similar legislation at home by copying from foreign
legislations. 63 Glenn points out that Mexico "created a law for non-
possessory security interests in moveable pro erty that is substantially
based on the laws of the U.S., [and Canada]." The Chilean legislature
has similarly borrowed from Quebec.65
In the process of copying, legislators even seek to improve the foreign
law by making changes. 66 The advantage may be that the legislator has
a whole array of domestic laws to choose from and can choose the best
law. Glenn calls this "legislative transnationalism. ''67 Although at first
blush this looks like a process of unintended harmonization, in fact it is
not so. The copying legislature is free to make whatever changes it
deems fit, and harmony is lost as another version of the law springs up
adding to the diversity. Even if the copy is identical, this kind of
62. See UNCITRAL, Report of the UNCITRAL on the Work of its Thirty-ifth
Session, 35th Sess., Supp. No. 17, U.N. Doc. A/57/17 (2003).




67. Id. According to Glenn, the process of "legislative transnationalization" can
be aided by the creation of Model Laws. In his view, this would at least provide a unity
at the starting point as states would only diverge for good reason.
harmonization can at best be fragmented.
Copying is not an adequate solution for many reasons. First, the law of
the original country or countries may itself be crying out for reform.
Second, the copying of another country's law results in an absence of
participation in the legislative drafting process. In copying another
country's law, there will also be the unnecessary copying of the political,
financial, and interest group compromises that resulted in the adoption of
that law. This baggage is not only unnecessary, but is also undesirable.
Harmonization may provide the answer. It provides these nations with
ready to adopt legal instruments that reflect the requirements of
international commerce, while allowing them to participate in the
formulation of the instrument. The problem of many nations not
possessing the expertise required to craft legal instruments on their
own 68 is also alleviated to some extent. The harmonization process
allows them to draw upon a wealth of international expertise and build a
body of scholarship for their own countries.
One recent example of modernization being a motivation for
harmonization is the case of aircraft financing. With the enormous
growth in civil aviation, demand for aircraft has skyrocketed. This is
especially true of developing countries which did not have an extensive
aviation industry even a decade ago. A concomitant development has
been the privatization of many national carriers, with the result that these
new private operators have to fend for themselves in obtaining
financing. The law has been left behind and in the absence of a law that
protects creditors' interests, the extension of credit to finance aircraft
acquisitions is difficult. 69 The law has a direct impact on the availability
of financing. The 2001 UNIDROIT Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment and its Aircraft Protocol were adopted
with a view to achieve this direct impact and countries with deficient
legal regimes have a good reason to adopt it.70 The sheer proliferation in
attempts to harmonize and hence modernize the law on secured credit is
68. Farnsworth notes that "[s]maller and poorer countries, however, are often
unable" to field experts even for meetings. While this may be because these countries do
not consider a particular harmonization endeavor to be of sufficient political significance
to justify the costs involved in sending experts to meetings, it is nevertheless a pointer to
the disparity in distribution of expertise amongst nations. See Allan Farnsworth,
Unification and Harmonization of Private Law, 27 CAN. Bus. L.J. 48, 59 (1996).
69. Terena Penteado Rodrigues, International Regulation of Interests in Aircraft:
The Brazilian Reality and the Unidroit Proposal, 65 J. AIR L. & CoM. 279, 281 (2000).
One indicia of the growth in the aircraft sector can be seen by the fact that over the next
twenty years Airbus Industrie and Boeing Company estimate a combined delivery of
30,650 aircraft. See David Clancy & Gregory Voss, Facilitating Asset-Based Financing
and Leasing of Aircraft Equipment Through The Proposed Unidroit Convention:
Manufacturers' Perspective, 23 AIR & SPACE L. 287, 287-88 (1998).
70. Clancy & Voss, supra note 69, at 288.
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an eye-opener to its importance: while the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has spearheaded such
attempts in Eastern Europe, in Asia it is under the umbrella of the
Asian Development Bank (ADB). 72  The Organization of American
States (OAS) has crafted a Model Inter-America Law on Secured
73Transactions for Latin America. This is vigorous activity by any
74
standards. It is a sure sign of the persuasiveness of harmonization as a
tool for modernization, given the reality that the law of credit is directly
related to the freeing up of markets and the expansion of trade.
An illustration of harmonization's modernization function can be seen
in the Mexican experience with regard to secured transactions law.
Before the enactment of the New Secured Transactions Law, Mexico's
outdated law did not serve the purpose for which it was designed.75
There were a number of security mechanisms which caused confusion.
71. In 1993 the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development published a
Model Law on Secured Transactions, designed to be a guide those states of Central and
Eastern Europe that were interested in modernizing their securities and financial laws. It
was also meant to spur harmonization of the law among these states. In the words of its
drafters, the "principle which has guided the drafting of the Model Law has been to
produce a text which is compatible with the civil law concepts which underlie many
central and eastern European legal systems, and at the same time, to draw on common
law systems which have developed many useful solutions to accommodate modem
financing techniques." European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, An
Introduction to the European Bank's Model Law on Secured Transactions, at
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/1aw/st/modellaw/modellaw0.htm (last visited Feb.
5, 2004).
72. Claps & McDonnell, supra note 25, at 398.
73. Id.
74. This could be explained by Professor Goode's view that "Without an adequate
legal regime for personal property security rights, it is almost impossible for a national
economy to develop. Indeed, the World Bank considers the role of security so central in
promoting economic growth that before making a loan to a developing country it will
normally seek to establish to what extent a sound legal system for the creation and
protection of security interests is or will be in place." Roy Goode, Security in Cross-
Border Transactions, 33 TEx. INT'L L.J. 47, 47 (1998). He notes the impetus as
stemming from the growth of the private sector in countries that had a predominant
public sector, with the result that sovereign risk has been converted to enterprise risk, the
growth in asset-based financing of high value equipment, the evolution of multinational
syndicates to finance loans that are too large to be handled by the banks of any one
country; the fact that collateral extended by multinational companies may not be in just
one country, the growth of securitization, and the globalization of securities markets. Id.
75. See Hale E. Sheppard, Overcoming Apathetic Internationalism To Generate
Hemispheric Benefits: Analysis of and Arguments of Recent Secured Transactions Laws
In Mexico, 10 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 133, 141 (2001); See also Boris Kozolchyk,
What To Do About Mexico's Antiquated Secured Financing Law, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMp. L. 523, 526-28 (1995).
There was no concept of a uniform security interest and the existence of
this menu of instruments was a severe obstacle to the extension of credit.
Even if credit was extended, litigation was rampant. Observers claimed
that the reluctance of foreign entities to lend in Mexico was a foregone
conclusion in light of such pervasive legal confusion.76 According to
Sheppard, "the overwhelming majority of small and mid-size businesses
failed to obtain credit at a reasonable cost because they did not possess
land, the only collateral acceptable to skeptical lenders. 77  Mexican
businesses were required to provide cash or property located in the U.S.
as collateral before they were extended loans. If collateral was not
available, "then the ability of a Mexican company to obtain credit [was]
severely limited because of concerns by U.S. banks as to their ability to
obtain enforceable security interests in Mexico. 78 U.S. lenders were
reluctant to extend credit to Mexican entities.79 Professor Sheppard cites
experts who state that "[t]here are numerous lenders in the United States
and elsewhere who would like to come into Mexico to do business if the
Mexican laws were more supportive to the lenders., 80 He also quotes
other experts who claim that the legal deficiencies in terms of secured
lending actually contradicted the spirit of NAFTA. Although the trade
agreement allowed U.S. and Canadian institutions to take part in lending
transactions in Mexico, "they are constantly rejecting otherwise viable
requests for loans from Mexican companies because of the inability to
create security interests in assets located in Mexico. 81
The New Secured Transactions law based on Article 9, is a kind of
harmonization achieved by borrowing, and has served to modernize
Mexico's secured transaction laws. The experience with regard to
secured transactions law is as good a case for the need for harmonization
brought about by market forces as there is ever likely to be. There is
virtually a consensus in opinion that a modern secured credit law is a
sine qua non for the availability and the lowering of the cost of credit.82
76. See Todd C. Nelson, Receivables Financing to Mexican Borrowers: Perfection
of Article 9 Security Interests in Cross-Border Accounts, 29 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
525, 546 (1998).
77. Sheppard, supra note 75, at 145-46.
78. Id. at 146.
79. Id. at 176.
80. Id. at 175.
81. Id.
82. UNCITRAL, Draft Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.9, available at http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm. UNCITRAL
noted that deficiencies in the law in this area could have major negative effects on a
country's economic and financial system, and observed that:
an effective and predictable legal framework had both short- and long-term
macroeconomic benefits. In the short term, namely, when countries faced
crises in their financial sector, an effective and predictable legal framework
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As credit is the life-blood of commerce, the flow-through benefits for
international trade from harmonization are obvious. There is also a
redistributive function to harmonization here-no less a body than
UNCITRAL believes that modern secured credit laws could alleviate
inequalities in access to lower-cost credit between parties in developed
countries and those in developing countries, with resulting improvement
in the share of developing countries in the fruits of international
commerce. 83  Accordingly, modernization will not only be of legal
systems, but also of other aspects of life, impacted as it is by the ability
to afford high value equipment due to the extension of credit.
Harmonization also serves the modernization function from a general
systemic standpoint. Historically, legal systems in developing countries
have been criticized for numerous reasons. Their legal institutions are
congested, poor, corrupt, and in general incapable of adequately
performing the functions for which they exist. The legal systems are
characterized by uncertainty derived from the ambiguity of the laws
which is compounded by uncertain interpretation by the courts. Many of
these problems are endemic to legal systems throughout the developing
world. They are all characterized by insufficient resources to support
courts and judges, inefficient and corrupt dispute resolution procedures,
convoluted procedural laws, and outdated substantive laws. There may
also be systemic inefficiencies that have crept in as a result of these
factors, exacerbated by a lack of critical study and impetus to change.
Almost without exception these legal systems are thought to need a
thorough overhaul to bring them in line with modern requirements.
There can be no better solution than harmonization, in any of its myriad
forms, to achieve this modernization at a systemic level. It would be
impossible for any system to acquire the knowledge and resources to
was necessary, in particular in terms of enforcement of financial claims, to
assist the banks and other financial institutions in controlling the deterioration
of their claims through quick enforcement mechanisms and to facilitate
corporate restructuring by providing a vehicle that would create incentives for
interim financing. In the longer term, a flexible and effective legal framework
for security rights could serve as a useful tool to increase economic growth.
Indeed, without access to affordable credit, economic growth, competitiveness
and international trade could not be fostered, with enterprises being prevented
from expanding to meet their full potential.
Id.
83. Id. (cautioning that such laws needed to strike an appropriate balance in the
treatment of privileged, secured and unsecured creditors so as to become acceptable to
States).
take corrective action alone. Harmonization places the world's
resources at the developing world's disposal in terms of its intellectual
capital, and also carries with it legitimacy afforded to it by the
reputations of the world's foremost experts.
4. Reducing Costs
Requirements imposed by various national legal systems can be
extremely costly to business. These can range from the bare cost of
legal advice to costs imposed by the law's inadequacy for international
commerce. One illustration of the latter is again easily discernible in the
instance of the law regarding the extension of credit. The
unpredictability and uncertainty caused by differing treatment by
national laws will necessarily affect credit cost. As uncertainty
increases, risk increases, and this risk is passed on to the debtor in the
form of higher credit cost. In international transactions, this uncertainty
stems from the very outset in the form of the uncertainty as to the
applicable law to govern the transaction. Even once the applicable law
is determined, parties have to educate themselves about their rights and
obligations under that law. There is then the substantive problem that
the applicable law may not be creditor-friendly. For example, the
creditor may not be able to repossess the assets in the event that the
debtor defaults in making payment. In these circumstances, the
existence of a single instrument that governs all aspects of the
transaction can play a major role in reducing risk and thereby reducing
costs, thus leading to a better use of resources. 84  Because the
harmonized law subjects a transnational commercial transaction to a
single set of rules, it increases the likelihood that there will be a
production of efficient law, but there are some risks involved .85
5. Providing a Neutral Choice of Law
Parties in international commercial transactions may be loath to
disavow reliance on their own laws, particularly when they happen to be
84. See Anthony Saunders et al., The Economic Implications of International
Secured Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 309, 310
(1999) (proclaiming the advantages of the International Institute for the Unification of
Private Law, commonly known as UNIDROIT, and its Convention on International
Interests in Mobile Equipment as modified by the Aircraft Equipment Protocol).
85. Steven Walt, Novelty And The Risks Of Uniform Sales Law, 39 VA. J. INT'L L.
671, 672 (1999)(explaining that uniform law is a "mixed blessing" for three reasons: (1)
uniform law can increase the impact of inefficient rules; (2) despite uniformity there is
the risk of differences in implementation; and (3) novelty in uniform law risks
uncertainty in what the legal rule itself requires).
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government entities. This is quite logical given that they know their
own legal systems best and are most comfortable using their own laws.
There is also the fact that government entities may view subjection of
the contract to another national law as an affront to their sovereignty and
prestige. This can result in a stalemate if both parties take the same
position. This sort of situation is not uncommon and in many such cases
the contract is subjected to vague notions such as "the general principles
of law." Professor Berger gives the example of two arbitral cases of this
sort, where the contracts stated that they were subject to "Anglosaxon
principles of law" and the "principles of natural justice. 86  In such
circumstances, the harmonized law can provide a way out of the impasse
by allowing the parties to rely on a neutral law to govern the transaction
without requiring a compromise from either party. In the example cases,
the arbitrators applied the UNIDROIT Principles, trade usages, and the
parties' national laws, as a synthesized law that governed the contract.8 7
In the Eurotunnel arbitration, the arbitrators and parties again applied the
UNIDROIT Principles when the choice of law clause stated that:
[t]he construction, validity and performance of the contract shall in all respects
be governed by and interpreted in accordance with the principles common to
both English and French law, and in the absence of such common principles by
such general principles of international trade law as have been applied by
national and international tribunals. Subject in all cases, with respect to the
works to be respectively performed in the French and in the English part of the
site, to the respective French or English public policy (ordre public)
provisions.8
8
Although neutrality of choice as a reason is not as persuasive as it
used to be for creation of international conventions, it is significant that
the 1980 Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods, met
with much success, with this as a major reason for adoption. Concerns
of neutrality can only find more favor as international arbitration grows.
C. Arguments Against Creating International Commercial Law
Not everyone is convinced that harmonization is desirable.89 In recent
86. Klaus Peter Berger, International Arbitral Practice and the UNIDROIT
Principles ofInternational Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 129, 143 (1998).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 144 n.69.
89. "Many harmonization claims must be met with skepticism for it is unclear
whether harmonization is the best solution to the underlying problem, and even if it is, it
may impose unacceptable costs." Leebron, supra note 31, at 64.
years, there has been criticism both of the need for and the methods
employed by harmonizing agencies. 90 It has been argued that many of
the products of harmonization endeavors were unnecessary, and in fact
are detrimental to international commerce.9' Although Stephan concedes
that the reduction of "legal risk" may foster commerce, he argues that
such a reduction is not without a cost.92 He gives the example of a rule
which voids all late deliveries and has the virtue of certainty, but which
may be less preferable to an ambiguous rule that recognizes extenuating
circumstances.93 This is a rather simplistic view of the harmonization
process. Harmonization does not aim to provide a mechanical lowering
of risk. In pursuit of the best solution, it will take on board principles
that might optimize risk, rather than seek its elimination.
Stephan understandably takes a very dim view of the benefits of
harmonization:
International unification instruments display a strong tendency either to
compromise legal certainty or to advance the agendas of interest groups. In
either case they offer no obvious gains as compared to rules produced through
the national legislative process. In particular, we have no reason to expect these
instruments to achieve substantial improvements in the law, if we may
disregard what the interest groups get out of their adoption .... And what
reduction of legal risk the instruments achieve comes mostly, if not entirely,
through conceding the field to specific interest groups, whether carriers,
bankers, or other cohesive minorities.
94
This conclusion will be examined in the light of some of the general
criticisms considered below.
1. Diversity is a Virtue
This school of thought holds that national laws are as much a product
as anything else and that because of the needs of international
commerce, nations have an incentive to compete to craft the best law.
According to these scholars, harmonization acts as an impediment to
innovation.95 Daniels contends that it is not sufficient to assert that there
are costs imposed by the diversity in national laws, but that it is
90. See J.S. Hobhouse, International Conventions and Commercial Law: the
Pursuit of Uniformity, 106 L. Q. R. 530 (1990).
91. Stephan, supra note 48, at 744.
92. Id. at 747.
93. Id. (stating that the taste for risk, like the taste for spicy food, varies from
person to person).
94. Id. at 788.
95. See Ronald J. Daniels, Should Provinces Compete? The Case for a Competitive
Corporate Law Market, 36 McGILL L.J. 130, 130 (1991). Although Daniels's criticisms
are in the context of provinces in a federal structure, they apply in the international
context as well. For a discussion of these criticisms, see Ziegel, supra note 30, at 136.
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necessary to show that these costs exceed the'benefits.96
This position follows from the belief that parties must have great
autonomy to choose whichever law they think is best to govern their
transaction. The consequent fallout is that countries will compete to
produce laws that may be more attractive. The fallacy in this line of
thinking is manifest-it would result in a kind of perverse competition
where some of the very fears advanced by the skeptics, viz., dominance
by powerful interest groups, magnified transaction risks, etc., are all
heightened. Stephan and others advance the analogy of U.S. corporate
laws, where different states have competed to attract companies to
incorporate within their boundaries by dangling the carrot of better legal
treatment.97 This, they argue, has resulted in a race to the top with
Delaware boasting the best climate for incorporation. This analogy
wears thin when transplanted to the international context. First,
corporate law is quite different from commercial law. The former, at
least for the purposes of this argument, only concerns a voluntary choice
to incorporate, and the obligations that flow from that are transparent.
Commercial law brings problems that are not voluntarily subscribed to,
and drags in third parties who may not know what the rules are. The
other obvious difficulty is that it is impossible to compare states within
the United States with poor countries! Most U.S. states have greater
resources than the majority of the nations of the world, and the kind of
race to the top resulting from a move to create the "best law" is
chimerical in the international context. Moreover, while it is true that
some of the difficulties posed by different national laws in the
international commercial context may be overcome by parties choosing
the law that is to govern their transaction, this is not always the solution,
even assuming that parties had the free choice to exclude mandatory
rules. This is particularly the case when third parties' rights are
involved. At its barest minimum, harmonization reduces transaction
costs. 98 It reduces uncertainty and improves efficiency, which is more
than can be said for the "competitive law-making" scenario.
There is also a systemic attack launched by Pistor which argues that
instead of improving domestic legal systems harmonization undermines
the development of effective legal systems in developing countries. 99
96. Daniels, supra note 95, at 140.
97. Stephan, supra note 48, at 790.
98. Leebron, supra note 31, at76.
99. Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Pistor's thesis is based on the idea that legal rules are interdependent and
although transplanting external rules may be the best practice, it
"sterilizes the process of lawmaking from political and socioeconomic
development" and distances the lawmaking process from "the process of
continuous adaptation and innovation. ' 1°° Central to her argument is the
idea that law is a living, contextual instrument. Accordingly, the
creation of law outside the domestic context deprives it of the organic
quality of home-grown law. Pistor also points out that distillation of the
theoretically best legal rules from various legal systems results in the
creation of legal rules which have not been tested in the laboratory of a
real world system. 101
Another argument is that such rules may also be resisted in practice by
courts and other institutions. Pistor gives the example of the Vienna
Convention on the International Sale of Goods to contend that in the few
cases where courts have applied the Convention, both parties were
apparently unaware that this Convention governed their transaction and
that very frequently parties who realize that they might be subjected to it
opt out by including a provision in the contract that explicitly denies the
application of the CISG.'12 While it is true that law is a living
instrument, Pistor's arguments lose much of their potency when one
considers that most countries have laws that are part of the common law
or civil law systems due to their imposition by colonial rule.
Accordingly, the law has grown somewhat in tune in the former
colonies, and the kind of harmonization that Pistor is talking about does
not have the deleterious impact that she argues it does. Instead of
stultifying organic growth, harmonization can actually facilitate growth
due to the education function it provides to lawmakers, and because of
the room for equal participation.
2. Lack of Representative Capacity
One of the criticisms advanced against harmonization concerns the
very nature of the bodies that play a role in this area. By their very
nature, these agencies are bodies of experts, and cannot satisfy
conventional democratic standards imposed on national legislatures.
They are not held accountable in the same way as are national bodies.
Even more worrisome is the fact that it is not clear if they are
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 98 (2002).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 102.
102. Id. at 110-11. According to Pistor the reason for opting out is that the parties
consider the "uncertainties involved in interpretation of the new terms and concepts" in
the convention "to be too high." Id. at I11.
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accountable at all, and if so to whom. This is an inherent weakness in
the process.
Some check on the process and its legitimacy is provided by the
simple fact that harmonized laws have to pass muster before national
legislatures before they come into force. Once a legislature takes for
consideration a harmonized instrument, it is no different from a piece of
domestic legislation. Thus there is a kind of filtered accountability.
Criticism exists that interest groups and lobbies may tilt the law in
favor of themselves and those who are less powerful do not have much
say in the drafting process, with the result that, at least with international
conventions, legislatures are saddled with a binary take-it-or-leave-it
choice. Stephan asserts that the nature of the bodies that play a role in
harmonization lead them to be unduly influenced by interest groups.'
°3
Critics of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) have argued that
Article 9 is creditor-centered because major lending organizations
dominated the U.C.C. drafting process.1°4 Scholarly literature questions
"the role of big banks, securities firms and major corporations in the
U.C.C. drafting process. 1°5  Although there is some merit in this
criticism, this is not unique to international lawmaking. Interest groups
play a major role in the making of domestic laws as well, and one can
only rely on the integrity of the legislators to ensure that laws reflect a
balance of interests. It must be conceded that it has historically been
difficult for smaller interest groups to be able to afford the resources
required to participate effectively in international lawmaking. However,
with advances in modem technology, particularly the Internet and
telephone and video conferencing, the barriers have fallen significantly.
One has only to look at the recent experience in the drafting of
international conventions in the public law area to see the impact of non-
governmental actors.1
0 6
103. Stephan, supra note 48, at 744.
104. Claps & McDonnell, supra note 25, at 415. While noting that the UCC system
accords primacy to the creditor's interest, they draw a contrast to the "legal order"
precautions which have the priority position in Argentine law, explained by the
Argentinean imperative to prevent fraud, mistake or overreaching. This, according to
them, could be because Argentina's current documentation requirements for registered
pledges are heavily influenced by the perception that earlier legislation allowing
registered pledges for agricultural machinery, crops and livestock was abused by
creditors. This could be true of many other nations, in particular those which had a
feudal and colonial history.
105. Id.
106. This is particularly visible in the drafting of environmental conventions, and in
Thus this criticism must be met with skepticism, and in any event
cannot be persuasive in ceasing harmonization efforts. At best, it can
serve as criticism for improvement. Moreover, as Burman notes, in
UNCITRAL, non-state actors have a role to play in the commercial law
area. He does, however, observe that this is an area of tension as non-
state actors believe that they should be as much involved with the
formulation of law as sovereign states.1
07
3. Inferiority of International Commercial Law
This is a more substantive concern, attacking the qualitative nature of
the product of harmonization. The argument is that the national law is
qualitatively superior. j 8 Critics argue that by its very nature international
draftsmanship requires compromises that severely enervate the resultant
law. 10 9 National sensibilities have to be balanced in order to obtain
acceptability. The quest for uniformity uncovers the reality that where
uniformity is not achieved, a "diplomatic uniformity" is hammered out,
very often in clever guises. l° One widely adopted tactic is that of a rule
immediately emasculated by an equally broad exception."' This was
particularly true before the last decade when the divides between
common law and civil law and between capitalism and socialism was
especially pronounced. Such ideological concerns have given way to
pragmatism and lawmakers are not particularly concerned with seeking a
balance anymore as they are with arriving at the best solutions. There is
the WTO process wherein NGOs have been included in the debate.
107. Burman, supra note 7, at 362.
108. To quote Professor Goode, once again, "there are those who consider that the
English law in all its majesty is greatly superior to anything that could be devised at
international level." Goode, Insularity or Leadership? The Role of the United Kingdom
in the Harmonization of Commercial Law, supra note 1, at 756.
109. Hobhouse, supra note 109, at 533.
110. See id. at 534 (arguing that uniformity achieved through diplomatic means, in
practice, does not represent a freely chosen system of codes and ultimately interferes
with parties' contracts).
Ill. See id. See also CISG, art. 16(l) ("Until a contract is concluded an offer may
be revoked if the revocation reaches the offeree before he has dispatched an
acceptance."); id. art. 16(2) ("However, an offer cannot be revoked: (a) if it indicates,
whether by stating a fixed time for acceptance or otherwise, that it is irrevocable; or (b)
if it was reasonable for the offeree to rely on the offer as being irrevocable and the
offeree has acted in reliance on the offer."); id. art. 43(1) ("The buyer loses the right to
rely on the provisions of article 41 or article 42 if he does not give notice to the seller
specifying the nature of the right or claim of the third party within a reasonable time after
he has become aware or ought to have become aware of the right or claim."); id. art.
43(2) ("The seller is not entitled to rely on the provisions of the preceding paragraph if
he knew of the right or claim of the third party and the nature of it."). These articles
exemplify various instances where rules become enervated as a result of the broad
exceptions made.
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no reason for international instruments to be 'inferior in quality to their
nationally drafted counterparts. In fact, the recently adopted conventions on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment, and The Hague Convention
on Security Interests held by Intermediaries illustrate the tremendously
high quality of drafting-something that was achieved only due to the
availability of international expertise. These examples are not likely to
be isolated instances as ideological divides crumble and the pursuit turns
to the best solutions for given problems of international commerce.
4. The Problem of Amendment
Unlike parties under easily-amended domestic laws signatories are
locked into an achieved harmonized instrument until a new instrument
comes into force. Given that international lawmaking is a time-
consuming process, this problem becomes pronounced. The further
problem is that unless all of the countries adopt the new instrument,
there will be even more discord than previously existed. This is
definitely a problem that harmonizing agencies have to be keeping in
mind. They must ensure that harmonization does not result in
petrification.
There are two aspects to this problem: the first is the inordinate time
taken to create international legal instruments. This is unavoidable to an
extent, given that experts from far flung corners of the globe have to
collaborate in drafting. However, the time frame for the drafting of
international conventions is rapidly shrinking due to the evolution of
modern communication techniques which dispense with travel
requirements. The Hague Convention is a classic case in point - it took
two years from start to finish, and it is hardly imaginable that domestic
legislation could have been completed in a shorter timeframe. The
second problem, and the root of the matter, is the extremely long time it
takes for countries to ratify the harmonized law. While the instrument
sits in cold-storage before it secures the requisite number of ratifications
to come into force, true harmonization is not achieved. It requires a
critical mass of the world's major commercial players to adopt the
instrument. This can sometimes take decades, and harmonizing agencies
are loath to render such hard wrought harmony nugatory by amending
the original text. The solution may lie in adopting innovative techniques
that dispense with the cumbersome requirements of adopting a new
instrument. In any event, it follows that if the area for harmonization is
well chosen, there will be sufficient impetus from industry to adopt the
instrument, and hence some of the time problems may be overcome.
5. Entrenched National Preferences
Many of the arguments againsi harmonization are motivated by thinly
disguised parochialism. Lawyers and legal systems are reluctant to give
up reliance upon their own familiar laws, and this reluctance is
sometimes due to a view that their own laws are superior. There may
also be the fear that their national laws would lose their pre-eminent
position, and this would translate into a reduction in business. As Forte
points out with regard to the United Kingdom's reluctance to ratify the
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods,
1980, "If the Convention were ratified by the UK and.., came to be
widely applied to international sales, with or without a connection with
this country, the role of English law in the settlement of international
trading matters would obviously be diminished. A consequential effect
might well be a reduction in the number of international arbitrations
coming to this country."' 2 This is definitely a legitimate concern and
there is no need to denigrate the need for self-preservation. Legal
services are as much a product as anything else and London as the pre-
eminent commercial center is a huge market. English law is extensively
relied on by parties in commercial transactions and this provides
business for English lawyers." 3 It is possible that the proliferation of
international law may erode the dominant position that it enjoys. 114
6. Loss of HarmonyDue to Interpretation by National Courts
Another oft-repeated criticism is that it is not worth the effort to
harmonize commercial law as any harmony that may have been crafted
by the instrument is fleeting due to the possibility of divergent
interpretations adopted by different national courts. Surprisingly enough,
this concern has not manifested itself very powerfully. National courts
have been more than willing to adopt an internationally oriented view
112. Angelo Forte, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Reason and Unreason in the United Kingdom, 26 U. BALT.
L. REV. 51, 58.
113. See id. Forte argues that "There is most definitely a self-perception that
English law is a world brand-name and that those entrusted with its adjudication should
be careful not to do anything which might jeopardize that position." Id. at 58.
114. Id. at 64-65. Forte points out that the 1989 Department of Trade and Industry
Consultative Document asking for views on the desirability of accession by the United
Kingdom to the Vienna Convention on the International Sale of Goods itself argued that
accession would allow courts and arbitrators in the United Kingdom to have a market
share in the resolution of disputes under the UN Convention and to participate in the
evolution of its jurisprudence. Id.
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towards the construction of international conventions and have accorded
them great deference. Courts have even been willing to consider
reference to travaux preparatoires in interpreting conventions.
1 5
As Lord Diplock stated in Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd.:
The language of that convention [the Warsaw convention on the international
air carriage of 1929, as amended by the Hague protocol 1955, and as scheduled,
in its amended form, to the UK Carriage by Air Act 1961] that has been adopted
at the international conference to express the common intention of the majority
of the states represented there is meant to be understood in the same sense by
the courts of all those states which ratify or accede to the Convention. Their
national styles of legislative draughtsmanship will vary considerably as between
one another. So will the approach of their judiciaries to the interpretation of
written laws and to the extent to which recourse may be had to travaux
preparatoires, doctrine and jurisprudence as extraneous aids to the
interpretation of the legislative text. The language of an international
convention has not been chosen by an English parliamentary draftsman .... It is
addressed to a much wider and more varied judicial audience than is an act of
parliament that deals with purely domestic law. It should be interpreted, as
Lord Wilberforce put it in James Buchanan & Co. Ltd. v. Babco Forwarding
and Shipping (UK) Ltd., [1978] A.C. 141, 152, 'unconstrained by technical rules
of English la,y.r by English legal precedent, but on broad principles of general
acceptation.
This view has found support in the United States as well. In
construing the Warsaw convention, the U.S. Supreme Court in El Al
Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng,117 relied on British decisions and held
that to allow recourse to national law would undermine the uniform law
that the Convention was designed to foster. It sent a clear signal that it
would adopt an international approach to construing the convention, and
explicitly stated that it would not like to upset the balance achieved
between competing interests in the Convention.
III. THE GROWTH OF REGIONALISM
A. Regional Endeavours Examined
The growth of regionalism is another nail in the coffin of state
sovereignty in the creation of international commercial law. It transfers
sovereignty from nation states to regional bureaucracies and results in
115. See Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd., 1981 A.C. 251; Abnett v. British
Airways PLC. Sidhu and Others, 1997 1 All E.R. 192; see also Gatoil Int'l Inc.
v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 1985 S.C. I (HL).
116. Fothergill v. Monarch Airlines Ltd., 1981 A.C. 251, 281-82.
117. El Al Israel Airlines v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155 (1998).
regional international commercial law. There are a multitude of regional
harmonization efforts and it is well nigh impossible to examine every
one of them. This paper contents itself with examining a few select
efforts at regional harmonization that lend themselves to drawing broad
themes for international harmonization.' As can be seen from the
following analysis, nation states are once again being pushed to the
margins as regional bureaucracies craft international legal instruments.
B. The European Union
The architects of the European Union thought that the establishment
of a successful economic community would require harmonization of
national laws; accordingly, Article 100 of the Treaty of Rome calls for
the harmonization of national laws as a means to help achieve a common
market." 18 This has served as the mandate for harmonization of civil and
commercial law." 9 European harmonization has proceeded on a sectoral
basis with many instruments in certain areas and minimal efforts in
others, 20 with the result that most areas of commercial law are still
subject to divergent national laws. According to some experts the current
piecemeal approach of harmonization has resulted in fragmentation and
systemic incoherence. There does not appear to be a grand scheme for
harmonization in the European Union, perhaps for good reason, and in
many ways harmonization is preceding on an ad hoc basis. This may
itself have resulted in divergence in E.U. private law.' 2' Ole Lando has
argued that "optional Europeanization" has to give way to "mandatory
Europeanization." 12
2
118. "The Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the
Commission ... issue directives for the approximation of such provisions laid down by
law, regulation or administrative action in Member States as directly affecting the
establishment or functioning of the common market." TREATY ESTABLISHING THE
EURPOEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, March 25, 1957, art. 100, 1 C.M.L.R. 573, 633
[hereinafter TREATY OF ROME].
119. Ulrich Drobnig, Creating International Legislation for the Twenty-First
Century: Unified Private Law for the European Internal Market, 106 DICK. L. REV. 101,
103 (2001).
120. Id. at 103-04. Drobnig writes that the vast majority of private law instruments
are focused on relatively small topics that have attracted the attention of the European
legislature. He points out that except in the fields of corporations, consumer contracts
and intellectual property, European private law is a patchwork of individual measures
aimed at specific economic or social needs.
121. DiMatteo, supra note 121, at 579.
122. Ole Lando, Optional or Mandatory Europeanization, 8 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L.
59 (2000).
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1. The European Civil Code
The European Parliament passed a resolution in 1989 in which it
requested that preparatory work be carried out for a European Civil
Code, or at least a European Code of Contract Law. 23 That plea was
renewed by the European Parliament in a 1994 resolution.12 4 The
ambitious quest to construct a European contract code has attracted
much academic discussion, with academics ranged fiercely on either
side. 125 This debate has also extended to the kind of instrument best
suited to achieve such a code. For some experts, the vehicle of
legislative harmonization is inappropriate for this task. 26 Some of their
arguments are based on cultural factors, particularly a legal system as
embodying a culture. Private law, they argue, represents the
accumulation of centuries of legal tradition as part of broader cultural
and social tradition. According to them, merely looking through the
trade lens and treating divergent national laws as mere distortions to
trade is to ignore this cultural aspect. Accordingly, imposing legislative
harmonization will insult the richness of this cultural diversity.
Professor Jurgen Basedow has argued that an E.U. codification of the
law of contracts is needed to harmonize the divergences in national
contract laws. 127 According to him, codification of European private law
would serve to create a single legal framework and foster the internal
market, facilitate information about European law, provide a common
point of reference for legal education, and create a professional
identification for European lawyers. He argues that if the need for
harmonization is deemed to be great enough, then the requirements of
the principle of subsidiarity can also be satisfied.12 8 With regard to the
123. European Parliament Resolution on action to bring into line the private law of
the Member States, 1989 O.J. (C 158) 400.
124. European Parliament Resolution on the harmonization of certain sectors of the
private law of the Member States, 1994 O.J. (C 205) 518.
125. Stephen Weatherill, Can There be Common Interpretation of European Private
Law? 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 139, 156 (2002).
126. Id.
127. Jurgen Basedow, Codification of Private Law in the European Union: The
Making of a Hybrid, 9 EUR. REV. PRIVATE L. 35, 43 (2001).
128. The subsidiarity principle of Article 3 of the E.C. Treaty states that "in areas
which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States." See George A.
Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and
the United States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331 (1994) (discussing the subsidiarity principal).
form that such harmonization should take, Basedow advocates the
enactment of a "Community Contracts Regulation" that would be
gradually phased in over a twenty- to thirty-year period. 1
29
One expert has argued that the attempt to create one legal order for
Europe should not be an exercise concerned only with European needs
but should be approached from a global perspective. 130  Prof. Mattei
contends that in building the new European legal order, the stake is
global and, therefore harmonization should be approached bearing in
mind the law in the United States and non-Western legal cultures.' 3' His
argument makes perfect sense as most other scholars seem to be
obsessed with European law to the exclusion of all else. Europe does
not exist in a vacuum and the fact that the civil law is not as dominant as
it used to be must be borne in mind when new solutions are created.
Further, it is a fact that U.S. law is currently viewed as the model by the
rest of the world, for better or worse, and a due examination of legal
solutions that have been created there may be profitable. Mattei is
clearly ranged on the side of the harmonizers and he is convinced that
the status quo, viz., no civil code, brings with it several costs. 132 He
labels these "information costs", and believes that despite a transaction
being intra-Community, transaction costs must be set aside by
businesses in order to obtain specialist advice on foreign law from local
lawyers.
Another expert opines that "diverse private law hampers the internal
market" whether that can be proven by empirical evidence or not., 33 In
response to the argument that private international law can solve the
problem, he believes that this is not an adequate solution, and points out
that in the long term the European Union cannot function effectively
with more than 20 different regimes of private law which are expressed
in different languages and deploying systematically different approaches.' 
34
This view is shared by Professor Lando.' 35 Prof. Von Bar's vision is
even grander: He argues that the EU must not confine itself to a sectoral
approach, but must try to formulate a broad "single currency" of law.1
36
129. Basedow, supra note 127, at 35.
130. Ugo Mattei, The Issue of European Civil Codification and Legal Scholarship:
Biases, Strategies and Developments, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 883, 889 (1998).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Christian v. Bar, From Principles to Codification: Prospects for European
Private Law, 8 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 379, 385 (2002).
134. Id.
135. Ole Lando, Principles of European Contract Law and UNIDROIT Principles:
Moving from Harmonisation to Unification? 8 UNIF. L. REV. 123, 124 (2003).
136. Id. Bar notes that the situation is entirely different from that of the U.S., as
there are multiple legal systems that work in different languages in Europe, and unlike in
the U.S., it is not possible to build on a shared legal tradition. He cautions that Europe
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The other side of the debate points to the experience of the United
States, where contract law exists in fifty different state forms, to say that
there is no need for a codification.' 1 7  They point out that there is
considerable trade already happening between European countries, and
this obviously means that legal costs are not that important. While it is
true that trade is continuing to grow despite the differences between
national laws, this cannot be taken to mean that the problems are
insignificant. Nor is the comparison with the U.S. particularly helpful
given the vast differences between the legal systems of the U.S. and
Europe. Barring Louisiana, all U.S. states have laws from the same
family, unlike the situation in Europe. There is also a common
language, and judicial decisions are cited across state borders in courts.
2. The Principles of European Contract Law
"In 1980, a group of lawyers formed the Commission on European
Contract Law (CECL) to draft general principles of contract law for the
countries of what was then the European Community."' The CECL is
popularly known as the Lando Commission after its founding father, the
Danish Professor Ole Lando. The group is a non-governmental body of
lawyers from the fifteen European Union countries. They are not selected
or appointed by any government, nor have they sought or received
instructions from government or community institutions. A majority of
the members are academics, not practicing lawyers. Although the
European Commission supported the work of the CECL in the early
stages, this was short-lived. 9 This is strange considering that the
should prevent a repetition the 19th century-type "national compartmentalization,
solitary codification and splendid isolationism." While conceding that cultural issues are
relevant, he appears to be a firm internationalist, and romantically argues that it should
be the culture of a truly European private law that must motivate harmonization.
137. See the text in A position paper on behalf of the Law Reform Committee of the
General Bar Council of England and Wales, stating that "We would suggest that those
concerns are often more imaginary than real. In the United States, the different states
have different systems of private contract law. This has not hindered cross-border trade
within the US. The reason why the difference in national contract laws are not a real
impediment to inter-state trade (whether in the US or the EU) is because the parties to a
cross-border transaction can currently stipulate for a choice of law clause to govern their
relationship, and effect will generally be given to that choice of law clause."
138. Ole Lando, The Common Core of European Private Law and the Principles of
European Contract Law, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 809 (1998).
139. Id. at 811. The Commission was convinced that the existing unified and
harmonized laws of the European Union dealing with contracts were fragmented and
uncoordinated, and did not contribute much uniformity. They were also concerned by
Commission has spoken out in favor of harmonization.
The CECL's work was animated by the belief that the growth of trade
and communication within the European Union makes unification of the
law of obligations, and notably the law of contract, imperative. 40 After
exhaustive comparative work, Part I of European Principles was
published in 1995. It deals with issues of performance, non-
performance, and remedies. A revised Part I, along with Part II, was
published in 1998. Part III was published in 2003. Together, Parts I and
II cover issues of contract law including formation, validity,
interpretation, performance, remedies, and authority of agents. Part III
covers issues including the effects of illegality, assignment, assumption,
statutes of limitations, conditions, procedural issues involving plurality
of parties, and capitalization of interest. These Principles of European
Contract Law have already been translated into Dutch, French, German
and Italian.
The PECL is much wider in scope than the CISG or UNIDROIT
Principles and can therefore form a complete regime for contract law,
especially for arbitration. 4  This comprehensiveness is necessary if
transacting parties are to take recourse to it. In the words of the CECL
itself, the PECL has a number of purposes: the "facilitation of cross-
border trade; strengthening of the single European market; creation of an
infrastructure for Community laws governing contracts; guidelines for
national courts and legislatures; and construction of a bridge between the
civil law and the common law."'142 It also lists five purposes for which
the European Principles are designed: "a foundation for European
legislation; express adoption by the parties; a modem formulation of a
the fact that there were severe problems caused by the lack of uniformity in
interpretation, and believed that uniform interpretation can be guaranteed only by a
common legal environment. It was felt that the absence of uniform rules hinders
interpretation and further disharmony is created. One result of this lack of uniform legal
environment is that in case of doubt, the interpreters have no recourse but to fall back on
their own law. Obviously, even though such interpretations may sit well with a
particular national law, in the overall scheme of things, uniformity is compromised. One
of the most revolutionary features of the PECL is that the authors have not been content
to merely find common solutions. They have gone beyond that objective to invent the
best solution to a given problem where necessary.
140. Mattei thinks that the problem with both the UNIDROIT Principles and the
PECL is that they offer restatements without having thoroughly looked at the basic
question that must be approached by every restatement, i.e., whether there is something
common to be restated and what it is.
141. Michael J. Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law: Similar Rules for the Same
Purposes? 26 UNIFORM L. REV. 229, 238-41 (1996). UNIDROIT Principles apply to all
forms of contract, including sale of goods and services contracts, but it is also limited to
commercial transactions. In contrast, European Principles not only apply to all forms of
contracts, but also apply to both commercial and consumer contracts.
142. DiMatteo, supra note 22, at 576.
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lex mercatoria; a model for judicial and legislative development of
contract law; and a basis for harmonization."'
143
The European Principles will perhaps find their best use in international
commercial arbitration, at least in the European context. They can
facilitate interpretation where there are gaps. DiMatteo gives the example
of such a use in an arbitration proceeding where "the arbitration panel
cited Article 5:101(3) of the Principles of European Contract Law to
interpret an ambiguous contract term to imply a duty of cooperation
between parties in a contract of association."
There is vigorous activity ongoing in Europe. A group of scholars
called the Study Group on a European Civil Code, has released draft
articles on tort law, negotorium gestio, personal securities, sales,
services, transfer of movable property, unjust enrichment, long-term
contracts, and proprietary securities. There is another group of
academics, who are working on the "common core project." The
Common Core Project is sponsored by the University of Trento, Italy
and according to two of the principals in that project, Ugo Mattei and
Mauro Bussani, their task is that of cartography-charting the legal
landscape of Europe.145 Unlike the CECL, their confessed purpose is not
normative. Recognizing that it would be profitable to involve non-
Europeans in this endeavor as well, the organizers of the Trento project
invited American scholars to join the group, and some of them act as
general reporters. As further evidence of the amazing productivity of
European scholars is the work of the Center for Transnational Law
("CENTRAL") at Munster University, which published its list of
Principles, Rules and Standards of the Lex Mercatoria in 1996. 146
C. The American Experience Contrasted
The American experience is very different from that of the EU.
Despite the conclusion of NAFTA, there is no bureaucracy to actively
pursue harmonization. There appears to be less emphasis on formal
harmonization, and certainly no feeling of urgent necessity.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 577; Anderson Consulting Bus. Unit Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen
Bus. Unit Member Firms, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451 (Int'l Comm. Arb. 1999).
145. Mauro Bussani & Ugo Mattei, The Common Core Approach to European
Private Law, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 339, 341 (1998).
146. Berger, supra note 20, at 91, 97.
Harmonization appears to more of an informal process, and seems to be
encouraged more by U.S. dominance than any systemic endeavor to
harmonize. To those used to the vigorous activity occurring in Europe,
this seeming lack of activity is astonishing.
Professor Glenn opines that the law of the NAFTA countries is
"characterized by two broad phenomena: (1) an informal process of
harmonization, as national institutions adjust to the increase in cross-
border trade brought about by NAFTA, and (2) ongoing unilateralism...,,147
Therefore, massive harmonization endeavors have not been demanded of
comparable institutions in America.148  Professor Glenn surveys the
landscape and concludes that most of the change in the conflict of laws
has evolved spontaneously in nations. 49 These changes have not been
imposed by any international organization. Not surprisingly, the
examples of such an evolution that he provides involve modifications to
the laws of Canada and Mexico which have been essentially the
transplant of U.S. legal principles. This seems to be hegemonic, but is
perhaps inevitable given the regional dynamics. The great increase in
trade resulting from a free trade agreement particularly between the
United States and Mexico has pushed the Mexican legal system to
converge with that in the United States. 50 Given that both Mexico and
Canada want to increase trading opportunities with their more powerful
neighbor, the United States can take a more indifferent approach to
harmonization. Legal experts in the United States have been more than
willing to export their own laws to Canada and Mexico, and indeed the
rest of the world, often with a take-it-or-leave-it attitude resting on their
economic might.151  NAFTA experience also reveals greater judicial
cooperation across national borders in contrast with Europe. Professor
Glenn states that transnational meetings of judges are multiplying, under
the sponsorship of Judicial Councils. One result of such judicial
interaction may be the growing tendency of Judges to "engage
increasingly in 'judicial parallelism,' accompanied by a greater resort to
147. H. Patrick Glenn, The Morris Lecture: Conflicting Laws in a Common
Market? The NAFTA Experiment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1789, 1792 (2001).
148. Professor Glenn goes as far as to say that "the American experience stands for
the proposition, however, that a successful free trade association does not, in principle,
require any formal measures of private law harmonization whatsoever." Glenn, supra
note 33, at 232.
149. Glenn, supra note 147 at 1799.
150. Glenn, supra note 33, at 231.
151. This is apparent by the fact that there is no evidence that U.S. law has gone to
any lengths to undertake a harmonization that adopts principles from Canadian or
Mexican law. Accordingly, it would be safe to say that harmonization within the
NAFTA context is "Americanization." Although legislatures in Mexico and Canada
could have resisted this, financial sense impels them to do otherwise.
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transnational citation of judicial authority. " 52 This is a soft kind of
harmonization that results over a period of time. Harmonization has also
been achieved at the regional level by the Interamerican Conference on
Private International Law (CIDIP), an organ of the Organization of
American States. It has crafted conventions on bills of exchange and
checks, commercial arbitration, letters rogatory, foreign evidence, the
legal regime governing powers of attorney, and model laws on secured
transactions, and negotiable instruments.
153
D. Competition or Collaboration?
It is difficult to establish the true impact of regional harmonization
endeavors on international harmonization. While some scholars have
given instances where individual instruments or provisions within
instruments cause conflicts, they do not shed much light on the broader
issue. One way of approaching this issue may be to examine the debate
on the codification of European contract law. If it is thought that the
codification, or indeed even the evolution of principles would be
beneficial, this may tend to support the view that in areas where there are
vast divergences and difficulties at arriving at harmonization, regional
harmonization may be intensely beneficial. This is due to the simple
expedient of crystallizing the differences into a few broad regional
groupings, and thereafter harmonization starts off on an inter-regional
footing. The contrary view may be that regional harmonization leads to
wasted resources when the real problem is a global one. There are many
areas where harmonization is unnecessary in certain regions but may be
necessary in others. There is no need for the whole world to undergo the
152. Glenn, supra note 33, at, 243-44. He gives the example of a judicial practice
of transnational judicial collaboration which has developed in the NAFTA region in
international bankruptcy cases, as a result of which joint judicial protocols and even joint,
teleconferenced judicial hearings are undertaken. Glenn calls for the encouragement of such
practices in a broader range of cases wherever parallel proceedings are present or likely,
noting that the "judicial contribution to informal harmonization is possible if the
UNIDROIT Principles and Rules of Transnational Procedure are voluntarily adopted in
cases of transnational litigation, or used as a suppletive source of 'generally recognized
standards of civil justice."' See also A.M. Garro, On Some Practical Implications of the
Diversity of Legal Cultures for Lawyering in the Americas, 64 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 461, 476
(1995) (stating his belief that "an independent, powerful, and effective administration of
justice is crucial to foster serious expectations of free trade and sustained economic
development in the Americas").
153. Carlos Vazquez, Regionalism Versus Globalism: a View from the Americas, 27
UNIFORM L. REV. 62 (2003).
process, or for the affected region to wait for international action in such
cases. A classic case is that of the contract code. Regions other than
Europe have no interest in such a codification, and the absence of the
European Union as a forum to ventilate this need may well have resulted
in the rest of the world being dragged into this debate.
Even in areas where there is an overlap of effort, there is scope for
cooperation and collaboration. This can result in similar solutions being
evolved as a matter of simple exchange of ideas, and facilitates
international harmonization. In fact, due to such close interaction,
regions may be able to adopt a harmonizing instrument well before
conditions have arisen for such an instrument to be adopted on a global
scale. The resources required for the organization of a regional
instrument pale in comparison to those needed for an international
convention, and this is a tool that has to be better adopted to attain
incremental harmonization. There is also the increasing participation of
regional bodies in the work of international harmonizing agencies like
UNIDROIT, and this may get even stronger if regional bodies accede to
conventions en bloc. In sum, there is greater evidence pointing to the
fact that regional harmonization can facilitate international harmonization,
than that it is in any way inimical to such a process. As long as that
remains the case, regional harmonization must be encouraged.
IV. THEMES
The foregoing analysis is evidence that nation states are not as
important as they were prior to the end of the Cold War for the creation
of international commercial law. The analysis can be concluded by
looking at the evidence presented by two further aspects of the
harmonization process: first, the shattering of the idea that international
conventions are not the be-all and end-all of international commercial
law, and second, evidence that the growth of "soft law" is hastening the
demise of state sovereignty given its tremendous popularity.
A. International Conventions are not as Effective as Supposed
Traditionally it was thought that international conventions were the
best method of formulating international commercial law. This is principally
because international conventions are binding in nature, and once
ratified, have the great advantage that they usher in uniformity at the
starting gate. Accordingly, where possible this is the favored instrument
adopted by harmonizing agencies when they desire the creation of
binding law.
The binding nature of a convention as a vehicle for harmonization
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may itself be an Achilles heel. Countries which did not participate
enthusiastically in the drafting of a convention, or which do not believe
in the need for the convention will not want to be bound and will take
the easy option of not ratifying it. Further, due to the fact that conventions
take a very long time to create and require protracted negotiations and
compromise, they can remain petrified for a long time as the sponsoring
agencies do not want to lose whatever harmonization has been achieved
by embarking on amendment. 54 A brief survey of some conventions
and their acceptance rates illustrates the problems with this vehicle of
international commercial law.
The Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the International Sale of
Goods (ULIS), 1964 has only been ratified by eight countries. 5 5 The
Convention relating to a Uniform Law on the Formation of Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods (ULFIS), 1964, has also been ratified by
the same eight countries.156 The International Convention on Travel
Contracts, 1970, has received a mere three ratifications 157 and three
accessions. 158 The Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of
an International Will, 1973, has been ratified by three countries 59 and
acceded to by nine others. 160  The Convention on Agency in the
154. As the response submitted by the Society of Public Law Teachers In Great
Britain and Northern Ireland (STPL) states: "commentators on legal harmonization have
observed that rigid harmonization measures, such as international treaties, are often
inappropriate. Preparation of such instruments tends to be a long process, involving, as
it does, a search for common principles and the reconciliation of established principles
from different legal systems and traditions. Moreover, treaties and similar instruments
have been criticized as tending to be over rigid, lacking the flexibility to accommodate
changing commercial practices and respond to new problems. The United Nations'
Vienna Convention on Contracts for the Sale of Goods offers a prime example, having
taken over ten years to prepare." They also state that the CISG is "uncertain."
155. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-64ulf.htm for a list of
countries that have ratified ULIS (United Kingdom, San Marino, Belgium, Israel,
Netherlands, Italy, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, and one accession,
Gambia). The Convention has since been denounced by Italy, the Federal Republic of
Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Israel. Id.
156. Id.
157. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-70.htm for a list of countries
that have ratified the International Convention on Travel Contracts (Belgium, Togo, and
Italy, and then denounced by Belgium effctive in 1994).
158. Id. (listing the accessions of Benin, Cameroon, and Argentina).
159. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-73.htm for a list of countries
that have ratified the Convention providing a Uniform Law on the Form of an
International Will (Ecuador, Belgium, France).
160. Id. (listing the accessions of Niger, Portugal, Canada, Libya, Yugoslavia,
Cyprus, Italy, Slovenia, Bosnia).
International Sale of Goods, 1983, has been ratified by two countries 161
and acceded to by three others. 162 The convention has not yet entered
into force as it requires ten countries to accept it. The UNIDROIT
Convention on International Financial Leasing, 1988, has been ratified
by four countries' 63 and acceded to by five others. 164 The UNIDROIT
Convention on International Factoring, 1988 has also been ratified by
four countries 165 and acceded to by two others.' 66  The UNIDROIT
Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects, 1995, has
been better received. It has been ratified by eleven countries '67 and
acceded to by ten others.168 The Convention on International Interests in
Mobile Equipment has been ratified by one country till date. 1
69
The Hague Conference has had a slightly better record in the uptake of
its conventions. The Convention on the Law Applicable to Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 1986, which has been ratified by
Argentina and acceded to by Moldova has not yet entered into force.
After Argentina's ratification in 1991, nothing happened till 1997 when
Moldova acceded to it. The Convention on the Law Applicable to
Trusts and their Recognition, 1985, has been ratified so far by Australia,
Canada, Hong Kong, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, and the United
States. 17  The Convention on the Law Applicable to Agency, 1978, has
been ratified by a mere four countries. t72 The Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, 1971, has been ratified by just four countries:
161. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-83.htm for a list of countries
that have ratified the Convention on agency in the International Sale of Goods (Italy and
France).
162. Id. (listing the accessions of South Africa, Mexico, and the Netherlands).
163. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-88-I.htm for a list of countries
that have ratified the UNIDROT Convention on International Financial Leasing (France,
Italy, Nigeria, Panama).
164. Id. (listing the accessions of Hungary, Latvia, Russia, Belarus, Uzbekistan).
165. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-88-f.htm for a list of countries
that have ratified the UNIDROT Convention on International Factoring (France, Italy,
Nigeria, Germany).
166. Id. (listing the accessions of Hungary and Latvia).
167. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.htm for a list of countries
that have ratified the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects (Lithuania, Paraguay, Romania, Peru, Hungary, Bolivia, Finland, Italy, Croatia,
Cambodia, Portugal).
168. Id. (listing the accessions of China, Ecuador, Brazil, El Salvador, Argentina,
Norway, Spain, Azerbaijan, Slovakia, and Guatemala).
169. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-2001-convention.htm for a list of




172. See http://www.hcch.net/e/status/stat27e.html (Argentina, France, Netherlands,
and Portugal, with the last of the ratifications coming as far back as 1992).
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Cyprus, Netherlands, Portugal, and Kuwait. 173 While this is the status of
the Hague family of conventions on commercial matters, other
conventions sponsored by the Hague Conference have met a much better
fate. For instance, the Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction has been ratified by 74 countries. 174  Similarly, the
Convention on the Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Inter Country Adoption, 1993, has been ratified by 41 countries and
acceded to by 14 others.175
UNCITRAL has the best record on adoption with regard to its
international conventions. The New York Convention on the
Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958, is perhaps the most
successful convention ever with 134 ratifications. 176 A slightly lesser
place in the UNCITRAL pantheon is taken by the Vienna Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 1980, which has been
ratified by 62 countries. 77 The New York Convention on the Limitation
Period in the International Sale of Goods, 1974, as amended by the
Protocol of 1980, has been ratified by 18 countries. 178  The United
Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978 (known as
the Hamburg Rules), has been ratified by 29 countries, with the latest
ratification being that of Syria in 2002. 17 However, none of the major
maritime nations have ratified this Convention, so in reality it is of little
significance.
It is clear that the mere adoption of a Convention does not achieve
173. See http://www.hcch.net/e/status/statl6e.html (Kuwait acceded to the convention in
December, 2002).
174. See http://www.hcch.net/e/status/abdshte.html (Ratified by Argentina, Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Bosnia, Canada, Hong Kong, Macau, Croatia, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, Macedonia, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, and Venezuela).
175. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Concise Status Report
Convention #33, http://www.hcch.net/e/status/adoshte.html (last modified Dec. 3, 2003)
(Ratified by Mexico, Romania, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, Poland, Ecuador, Peru, Costa Rica,
Burkina Faso, Philippines, Canada, Venezuela, Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway,
Netherlands, France, Colombia, Australia, El Salvador, Israel, Brazil, Austria, Chile,
Panama, Italy, Czech Republic, Albania, Slovakia, Germany, Slovenia, Bolivia,
Bulgaria, Latvia, Luxembourg, Switzerland, United Kingdom, India, and Belarus).
176. For a full list of ratifying countries, see United Nations Commission on
International Trade Law, Status of Conventions and Model Laws, http://www.uncitral.




harmonization. As the preceding paragraphs show, despite the many
years expended in creating these conventions, sovereign states have
shown scant enthusiasm in many instances, prompting one to ask what
ails the convention as a harmonization vehicle? One readily apparent
fact is that in some non-commercial law areas, conventions have been
readily ratified. This may be contrasted with the fact that the New York
Convention has achieved great success. The conclusion from these two
statements may be that the subject matter of the convention is the most
important factor. In areas perceived by states to be important and
desirous of harmonization, a crowded legislative calendar has not
deterred ratification. On the contrary, legislators have chosen to
disregard arcane and highly specialized areas. These issues have been
merely raised in this chapter and will be analyzed at greater length in the
chapter on Issues Post Harmonization.
B. The Growth of "Soft Law"
This is a vehicle for harmonization that has assumed tremendous
importance following the successful reception of the UNIDROIT
Principles of International Commercial Contracts. Without a doubt, the
tremendous flexibility offered by restatements has contributed to their
recent allure. Parties can adopt them on a voluntary basis, and they serve
many important functions. For example, the UNIDRO1T Principles of
International Commercial Contracts (hereinafter referred to as the
"UNIDROIT Principles") are viewed as "neutral" contract law principles
in that they reflect a balance of interests and have not been formulated
by any government.180 In cases where parties are unable to agree on the
law that is to govern their contract, the UNIDROIT Principles provide a
neutral law that both parties can adopt without losing face. In order to
fully grasp the quality of restatements as vehicles of harmonization, it is
essential to get an idea of how they are created. Restatements follow
extensive comparative law research, examining the laws of different
countries to show differences and similarities. After these have been
identified, the restatement is not a distillation of the lowest common




180. See Response submitted on behalf of the Society of Public Teachers of Law in
Great Britain and Northern Ireland (SPTL) to the European Commission's Communication
on Contract Law. The response further states that the UNIDROIT Principles could form
the basis of a legal "restatement" of contract principles to which contracting parties
could subscribe on a voluntary basis on a European level. According to them, an English
court would give effect to a contractual agreement to apply the UNIDROIT Principles in
place of the general rules of English law.
181. The Joint Response notes the need for comparative law research and
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Restatements also escape that great problem that shadows international
conventions-ratification. As the UNIDROIT Principles state:
[e]fforts towards the international unification of law have hitherto essentially
taken the form of binding instruments, such as supranational legislation or
international conventions, or of model laws. Since these instruments often risk
remaining little more than a dead letter and tend to be rather fragmentary in
character, calls are increasingly being made for recourse to non-legislative
means of unification or harmonization of law. 182
No doubt this has contributed, at least in the European context, to the
new enthusiasm for the use of restatements as vehicles for
harmonization. The Joint Response of the Commission on European
Contract Law and Study Group on European Civil Code to the
Communication on European Contract Law, states the authors' belief
that this is their preferred vehicle for European integration. 183 According
to the Joint Response, it is only after undertaking a comparative study of
the legal systems of Europe and after the crafting of a restatement that
the need for harmonization can be shown. 8 4 This in their view is due to
the fact that the process will not only reveal divergences across national
legal systems, but will also reveal commonalities. This is a very
important point, and one that has not been adequately appreciated. In
areas such as property law where the differences are so great across
national boundaries and where the sheer enormity of the law militates
against the adoption of a binding text, starting off with a restatement can
be very beneficial in that it narrows down the differences and winnows
out the commonalities. It makes the task of subsequent codification in a
binding form very much easier, and more importantly, can contribute to
harmonization on an incremental basis with countries having the liberty
of using the restatement for law reform purposes.
One of the great virtues of a restatement is its flexibility. It is capable
of modification unlike an international convention, and countries can
pick and choose rules from within a restatement depending on their
categorically asserts that it would not suffice to start off with one national law and make
changes to it. Id. In their own words, they "aim not to adopt the lowest common
denominator, but rather to suggest the best solution to the most important issues."
182. UNIDROIT, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS vii
(1994).
183. The Joint Response notes the need for comparative law research and
categorically asserts that it would not suffice to start off with one national law and make
changes to it. Id. In their own words, they "aim not to adopt the lowest common
denominator, but rather to suggest the best solution to the most important issues."
184. Id.
comfort level. 185 In many instances, restatements can be the building blocks
of national legislation, or at least can be a starting point for the national
legislator. 186 As noted by the Joint Response of the Commission on
European Contract Law and the Study Group on a European Civil Code,
national legislators in the European Union are using the Principles of
European Contract Law in reforming national legislation. They cite the
role that the PECL has played in the reform of the German law of
obligations, their use by the Scottish Law Commission in reports on
contract law reform, and use by the Spanish law reform commission.
187
The Joint Response canvasses an innovative vehicle that is a:
set of principles which may be molded more freely than legislation, while still
commanding the authority of a primary and binding legal source. This could be
achieved by a process of continual restatement where the evolving
jurisprudence of the courts in the development of the restatement is integrated,
along with academic tretnent, in the text of the code and accompanying
explanatory commentary.
This is an excellent idea as it exploits to the full the very essence of
the idea of a restatement. Rather than remaining a monument to
harmonization, it allows the restatement to move in sync with
developments across jurisdictions, and also overcomes the problem
posed by the fact that judges and arbitrators in all parts of the world
cannot have access to decisions from everywhere else. The restatements
can continually synthesize decisions on various issues from every
jurisdiction, a luxury which no judge has. They could form the source
that judges and arbitrators go to when deciding international commercial
cases.
The flexibility also extends to contracting parties who can choose to
include it in their contracts, or can ignore it altogether. In the view of
the authors of the Joint Response, party autonomy can be facilitated even
185. See ICC Response: "Although ICC would like to express concerns as to
whether non-binding principles are sufficient, it would like to also emphasize that such
principles are an effective first step towards harmonization. Important attempts already
exist, such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Transactions,
which are increasingly referred to in international contracts and in arbitration. Another
example is the Principles of European Contract Law, which ICC considers could serve as
an excellent starting point for the harmonization of European contract law."
186. See COMBAR Response: "In our view, the work of the Commission on
European Contract Law, and the Study Group on a European Civil Code is valuable, and
should be supported. A "Restatement" of contract law, which is what we would expect
to be the end result, though not in itself binding, may be expected to "harden" into law,
for example, by influencing the judicial process. At the least, where a provision of
national contract law diverges from those as stated in principles, courts may be
encouraged to consider whether such divergence is in fact justified by reference to
conditions obtaining in the country concerned."
187. Joint Response, at para. 37.
188. Id. at para. 46.
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more if the Rome Convention were to allow the application of
restatements. They contend that:
[o]ffering an additional legal system to choose as the governing law for a
contract would go a long way beyond merely offering terms that can be
incorporated into an agreement. It would represent a very substantial and
effective enhancement of the parties' autonomy because the law at their
disposal would be one which is pan-European and non-partisan in nature and
which will therefore have immediate appeal as an escape from the battle of
choosing one or other of the parties' national laws. 1
89
However, all is not smooth sailing. Given that they have no binding
force, restatements have the capacity of being reduced to mere ciphers.
As the Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the
"Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on European contract law" concedes, "in Europe recognition
of these private 'codes' by national judges when interpreting contract
clauses, clarifying the intention of the parties or settling disputes is a
problem, while elsewhere, non-State law can be taken into account, as is
the case, for example, under the Mexico Convention."'1 90
Professor Goode does not believe that the "soft" nature of
restatements has been a problem and opines that the PECL and the
UNIDROIT Principles have been successful "precisely because they are
not binding, have not been influenced by governments and do not pose
any threat to national legal systems. Like the UNCITRAL Model Law
on Arbitration they are designed to be a unifying influence and a
resource, but it is left to legislatures, courts and arbitral tribunals to
decide to what extent they assist in the solution of problems."
'1 91
1. The UNIDROIT Principles
The UNIDROIT Principles have been the subject of great scholarly
189. Id. at para. 36. The Joint Response further argues that "It would provide a
neutral body of law which as a composite would be equidistant from the parties' own
legal systems and yet have roots in both of them and with its dispositive and mandatory
rules fundamentally reflect the same economic, liberal and social values underpinning all
the national legal systems in the EU."
190. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee on the "Communication from
the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on European Contract
Law," 2002 OJ (C 241), 1.
191. Professor Goode's Response to the European Commission's Communication
on a European Civil Code. Professor Goode notes that the UNIDROIT Principles have
been "widely applied by arbitral tribunals, and even by some courts, and have influenced
national legislation in a number of countries." Id.
and arbitral attention. 192 Much of the scholarly writing has been done by
the authors of the UNIDROIT Principles themselves, giving the idea that
salesmanship, often neglected as a requisite for successful
harmonization, was given importance here.' 9  The Principles were
drafted by a working group specifically formed for the purpose, and its
members, who were from the different legal and socio-economic
systems, were leading experts. 194 They included academics, judges and
civil servants. Typical of UNIDROIT, the members of the working
group were appointed in their own capacity and not as representatives of
their governments.' 
95
In their comparative work, emphasis was not only placed on
considering as many national legal orders as possible but on finding a
synthesis between the different legal systems, especially between the
civil and the common law. Inevitably, instruments such as the American
Uniform Commercial Code, the Restatement (Second) of the Law of
Contracts, the draft of the new Dutch Civil Code, and the new Civil
Code of Qu6bec, which were more current embodiments of the law,
came in for more detailed consideration. The drafters also resorted to
the 1980 Vienna Sales Convention as it reflected international
consensus, at least on the law of sales.
Since their release the UNIDROIT Principles have enjoyed great
acclaim, and have even served as a guide for the reform of the laws of
some countries. They influenced the drafting of the Russian Civil Code,
the Estonian Law of Obligations and the Civil Code of the Republic of
Lithuania. 196 The development of the new Chinese contract law was
also significantly influenced by the CISG. '9
According to Professor Rosett, the greatest achievement of the
UNIDROIT Principles is that it persuasively demonstrates that basic
principles of contract law can be agreed upon by all major legal systems
192. The Unilex database contains hundreds of articles and books which discuss the
UNIDROIT Principles and it would take a few pages to even provide a snapshot view
here. UNILEX and UNIDROIT Principles International Commercial Contracts, at
http://www.unilex.info [hereinafter UNILEX on UNIDROIT].
193. The UNILEX database contains 60 articles by Bonell alone. Id.
194. The members of the working group (part It) included Bonell (Italy), Baptista
(Brazil), Crepeau (Canada), Date Bah (Ghana), Di Majo (Italy), El Kholy (Egypt),
Farnsworth (United States), Finn (Australia), Fontaine (Belgium), Furmston (U.K.),
Hartkamp (Netherlands), Huang (China), Jauffret-Spinosi (France), Komarov (Russia),
Lando (Denmark), Schlectreim (Germany), and Uchida (Japan).
195. Gesa Baron, Do the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts form a new lex mercatoria?, 15 J. CONT. L. 13, 20 (2001).
196. MICHAEL JOACHIM BONELL, AN INTERNATIONAL RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACT
LAW: THE UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS 236 et
seq. (2d ed. 1997).
197. M. Williams, An Introduction to General Principles and Formation of
Contracts in the New Chinese Contract Law, 17 J. OF CONTRACT LAW 13, 20 (2001).
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in a form that is not "too vague and general to be useful in the resolution
of specific disputes."' 9  He notes that "[t]his fact alone is immensely
valuable to those who seek a structure to commercial contract law that
can provide predictable and harmonious outcomes everywhere."' 
99
2. Efficacy of the UNIDROIT Principles
It is one thing to say that the Principles have received wide scholarly
recognition, and quite another to opine that they have achieved
acceptance in practice. The litmus test for any restatement is the respect
accorded to it by courts and legislatures. At least in the arbitral arena,
the UNIDROIT Principles have made a start. As the Principles state,
they can have application either as the lex contractus or as a supplement
to a national law or an international convention. The UNIDROIT
Principles have also been used as the reflection of the state of modem
contract law in many arbitral awards. This is so in many cases despite
the existence of a national law governing the contract. For instance, in
ICC case 9593, where the dispute was between two Ivory Coast
companies and the parties had agreed upon the law of the Ivory Coast,
the arbitral tribunal referred to the UNIDROIT Principles in deciding
that one of the parties had breached its obligation to cooperate in the
performance of contract and said: "Further to a comparative study,
UNIDROIT came to the conclusion that the obligation to cooperate in
good faith in the performance of a contract amounted to a general
principle applicable to international trade."200
In another award, the tribunal said,
The reasons why this Tribunal considers the UNIDROIT Principles to be the
central component of the general rules and principles regulating international
contractual obligations and enjoying wide international consensus, which
constitute the proper law of the contracts, are manifold: (1) the UNIDROIT
Principles are a restatement of international legal principles applicable to
international commercial contracts made by a distinguished group of
international experts coming from all prevailing legal systems of the world,
without the intervention of States or governments, both circumstances
redounding to the high quality and neutrality of the product and its ability to
reflect the present state of consensus on international legal rules and principles
governing international contractual obligations in the world, primarily on the
198. Arthur Rosett, The UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial
Contracts: A New Approach to International Commercial Contracts, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
347, 347 (1998).
199. Id. at 347-48.
200. ICC 9593, 10:2 ICC ICArb. Bull. 39 (1999) available at http://www.unilex.info.
basis of their fairness and appropriateness for international commercial
transactions falling within their purview; (2) at the same time, the UNIDROIT
Principles are largely inspired by an international uniform law text already
enjoying wide international recognition and generally considered as reflecting
international trade usages and practice in the field of the international sale of
goods, which has already been ratified by almost 40 countries, namely CISG;
(3) the UNIDROIT Principles are specially adapted to the contracts being the
subject of this arbitration, since they cover both the international sale of goods
and supply of services; (4) the UNIDROIT Principles have been specifically
conceived to apply to international contracts in instances in which as it is the
case in these proceedings, it has been found that the parties have agreed that
their transactions shall be governed by general legal rules and principles; (5)
rather than vague principles or general guidelines, the UNIDROIT Principles
are mostly constituted by clearly enunciated and specific rules coherently
organized in a systematic way .... 201
Further,
on the basis of at least two grounds, this Tribunal would not have been ...
prevented from referring to the UNIDROIT Principles as a part of the law
applicable to the contracts in absence of an express or implicit choice of law
situation: (1) ... the contracts are governed as a result of a preliminary finding,
by general rules and principles regarding international contractual obligations
enjoying wide international consensus, i.e., they are not governed by any
discrete domestic or national law ... (2) the application of the UNIDROIT
Principles does not depend on their self-given criteria of application, but on the
powers vested in this Tribunal under article 13(3) of the ICC Arbitration Rules,
which ... authorize it to directly determine the applicable law it deems more
appropriate to govern the merits, i.e., in this case, the general legal rules and
principles regarding international contractual obligations enjoying wide
international consensus, including without limitation, the UNIDROIT Principles
as an adequate restatement and expression of modern general legal rules and
principles.
2°2
Prof. Bonell, the chief architect of the UNIDROIT Principles, writes that
their use for the proper interpretation of the otherwise applicable
domestic law was not anticipated by the drafters! 20 3 According to him,
the statement in the Preamble 204 according to which [the UNIDROIT
201. ICC 7110, 10:2 ICC IC Arb. Bull. 39 (1999) available at http://www.unilex.info.
202. Id.
203. Michael Joachim Bonell, The UNIDROIT Principles as a Means of
Interpreting and Supplementing International Uniform Law, in UNIDROIT Principles of
International Commercial Contracts-Reflections on their Use in International
Arbitration, Special Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, ICC
2002, at 29.
204. Preamble (Purpose of the Principles):
These Principles set forth general rules for international commercial contracts.
They shall be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be
governed by them.
They may be applied when the parties have agreed that their contract be
governed by general principles of law, the lex mercatoria or the like.
They may provide a solution to an issue raised when it proves impossible to
establish the relevant rule of the applicable law.
They may be used to interpret or supplement international uniform law
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Principles] may provide a solution to an issue raised when it proves impossible
to establish the relevant rule of the applicable law was intended to cover only
those cases where it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to determine the
content of the applicable law because of the special character of the legal
resources and/or the cost of access to them.
205
Interestingly, Bonell points out that article 14 of the Model Contract
for the International Commercial Sale of Perishable Goods adopted by
the International Trade Center UNCTAD/WTO in 1999 allows for the
use of the UNIDROIT Principles: "In so far as any matters are not
covered by the foregoing provisions, this contract is governed by the
following, in descending oider of precedence: the United Nations
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, the
UNIDROIT Principles... ,,206
A survey of cases which have referred to the UNIDROIT Principles
reveals that parties have subjected their dispute to the Principles after the
dispute commenced even though the contract itself did not refer to it. In
one such case, an ad hoc arbitration in Paris dated 21/4/1997, the dispute
was between a Russian trade organization and a United States company
concerning a loan agreement. Although the agreement did not contain a
choice of law clause, after the dispute arose the parties agreed that the
arbitral tribunal should apply Russian law, if necessary, supplemented
by the UNIDROIT Principles.20 7 In another case before the Camera
Arbitrale Nationale ed Internationale di Milano, 1/12/1996, a dispute
between Italian and American parties, the parties agreed to the
application of the UNIDROIT Principles even though the contract did
not make any reference to it.2°8 In an arbitration before the Court of the
Lausanne Chamber of Commerce, 21/2/2002, the contract did not
contain a clear choice of law and the parties argued for the application of
instruments.
They may serve as a model for national and international legislators.
UNIDROIT PRINC. pmbl., reprinted in Bonell, supra note 196, at 271.
205. Bonell, supra note 203. He contrasts this situation with the role of the
UNIDROIT Principles to assist in interpreting and supplementing international
conventions, which was contemplated by the drafters. Such a view is also espoused by
Professor Rosett. See Rosett, supra note 198, at 354.
206. Bonell, supra note 203, at 32.
207. Loan Agreement Case (Russ. v. U.S.)(Ad hoc Arb., Paris 1997), available at
UNILEX on UNIDROIT, supra note 192. In giving its verdict, the arbitral tribunal
referred to Arts. 3.12 and 4.3(c) of the UNIDROIT Principles. Id.
208. Case A-1795/51, Commercial Agency Contract Case (Italy v. U.S.)(Camera
Arbitrale Nazionale ed Internazionale di Milano 1996), available at UNILEX on
UNIDROIT, supra note 192.
Swiss law, on the basis that it was a "neutral law." Since the contract
contained a reference to "general principles of law applicable to
international commercial contracts," they accepted the application of the
UNIDROIT Principles. 209  In another case before the same court, a
partial award, the facts were as follows:
a Turkish company and a company incorporated in Anguilla, West Indies, with
an office in the Philippines, [which had] entered into an agreement concerning
highly sophisticated equipment. The contract contained two provisions on the
choice of law, which appeared to contradict each other," one applying English
law and the other Swiss law... [t]he arbitral tribunal [suzgested that] the parties
choose the ... provisions of the UNIDROIT Principles.
2
Application of the UNIDROIT Principles where the contract led to the
application of the "general principles of law" is growing. There are
twelve such cases on the UNILEX database. In Andersen Consulting
Business Unit Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen Business Unit Member
Firms and Andersen Worldwide Societe Cooperative, the Tribunal held
that the UNIDROIT Principles are a reliable source of international
commercial law in international arbitration for they "contain in essence a
restatement of those 'principes directeurs' that have enjoyed universal
acceptance and, moreover, are at the heart of those most fundamental
,,211
notions which have consistently been applied in arbitral practice. In
a recent Russian arbitration where there were conflicting choice of law
clauses, the Tribunal held that it would apply the general principles of
law, and that the "UNIDROIT Principles were an expression of the
general principles of the lex mercatoria.21 2
From the foregoing it is clear that the UNIDROIT Principles are here
209. Manufacturing & Marketing Contract Case (Belg. v. Spain)(Arb. Ct. Lausanne
CCI 2002), available at UNILEX on UNIDROIT, supra note 192. The arbitral tribunal
was helped in its decision by the fact the application of the UNIDROIT Principles did
not offend mandatory rules in Switzerland, Belgium or Spain. Further, as the products in
question in the case should have been marketed in many countries, the tribunal found it
reasonable to apply the UNIDROIT Principles rather than a specific domestic law.
210. Equipment Contract Case (Turk. v. Anguilla)(Arb. Ct. Lausanne CCI 2002),
available at UNILEX on UNIDROIT, supra note 192. The award is dated 5/17/2002.
Id. In the final award, the arbitral tribunal referred to Arts. 7.4.2 and 7.4.7 of the
Principles, in order to justify a reduction of the compensable harm as part of the harm
was due to the conduct of the aggrieved party. Id. It also used Arts. 7.4.9 (2) and 7.4.10
to grant interest on the amount due. Id.
211. Anderson Consulting Bus. Unit Member Firms v. Arthur Andersen Bus. Unit
Member Firms, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 451 (Int'l Comm. Arb. 1999).
212. Case 11/2002, Commercial Services Contract Case (Russ. v. F.R.G.)(Int'l Arb.
Ct. CCI, Russ. 2002), available at UNILEX on UNIDROIT, supra note 192. Professor
Rosett is a believer in the following argument: The Principles are said to be a
Restatement of International commercial law and what is being restated is the lex
mercatoria. The UNIDROIT Principles thus provide substance to international practice
as a source of law; they give content to the claimed existence of a Lex Mercatoria." See
Rosett, supra note 198, at 354.
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to stay. They have come to be seen as embodying principles of such
quality that they may be safely used to settle disputes without either
party complaining about the law being adverse to him/her. This alone is
a huge contribution in international commerce. Further, the CENTRAL
research project on transnational commercial law showed that parties
were familiar with the UNIDROIT Principles and used them in many
instances to overcome language barriers. It confirmed many of the
findings of UNIDROIT which had conducted a study of about 1000
users of the UNIDROIT Principles to obtain information about the
practical application of the Principles. Although, the response rates are
very low, and may be skewed by the fact that many of the uses have
been in the context of arbitration, it is definitely indicative of the fact
that the sheer quality of the Principles are causing commercial players to
resort to them.
3. Principles of European Contract Law
The Principles of European Contract Law set forth general rules for
contract law in contrast to the UNIDROIT Principles, which restrict their
application to commercial contracts. Thus the UNIDROIT Principles
exclude consumer contracts. The PECL, on the contrary, expressly
include consumer contracts in their ambit. This is definitely important in
the European context with the ever growing body of consumer law, and
the PECL can serve as the context for these developments. The PECL
were definitely influenced by the UNIDROIT Principles as there was a
process of exchange between the drafters.214 Although the PECL have
not received the same kind of attention as the UNIDROIT Principles,
they have also been referred to by arbitral panels in recent cases. In
arbitral award no. 8128,2 5 at the ICC Court of International Arbitration,
213. Klaus Peter Berger, The Central Enquiry On The Use Of Transnational Law In
International Contract Law And Arbitration: Background, Procedure And Selected
Results, INT. A.L.R. 2000, 3(5), 145-56, 153-54 (2000).
214. Martijn W. Hesselink, The PECL: Some Choices Made By The Lando
Commission, GLOBAL JURIST FRONTIERS, Vol 1: No. 1, Article 4, at 8 (2001), at
http://www.bepress.com/gj/frontiers/voll/issl/art4 (noting that Professors Joachim
Bonell, Ulrich Drobnig, Arthur Hartkamp, Ole Lando and Denis Tallon were members
of both Commissions).
215. 1995. Available at http://www.unilex.info/dynasite.cfm?dssid=2377&dsmid=
13621&x=1. In facts showed that a Swiss buyer entered into a contract with an Austrian
seller for the supply of chemical fertilizer in order to fulfill a contract with a third party.
The seller has a contract with an Ukrainian supplier to obtain part of the fertilizer. The
buyer sent the Ukrainian supplier sacks that it had manufactured under the seller's
Basle, in awarding interest under Art. 78 of the CISG, the Arbitral
Tribunal applied the average bank short term lending rate to prime
borrowers, which is the solution adopted by Art. 7.4.9 of the UNIDROIT
Principles21 6 and by Art. 4.507 of the PECL. The Tribunal decided that
these fell under the rubric of the general principles on which the CISG is
based.
In arbitral award no. 9474 before the ICC International Court of
Arbitration at Paris, where the parties agreed to the Tribunal's proposal
at the beginning of the proceedings to apply "the general standards and
rules of international contracts," it decided to apply along with the CISG
"other recent documents that express the general standards and rules of
commercial law" such as the UNIDROIT Principles of International
Commercial Contracts and the Principles of European Contract Law.217
In another recent arbitration, where the parties had entered into a series
of agreements aimed at developing the defendant into an efficient
cement producer, despite the choice of law clause in the agreements
expressly providing that Lithuanian law applied, the Claimant invoked
the UNIDROIT Principles and the Principles of European Contract Law
as a source of trade usages referred to in Article 17 of the ICC Rules of
Arbitration. In the partial award on the issue of the applicable law, the
Tribunal acknowledged that both the UNIDROIT Principles and the
PECL represented the latest codification of international commercial
trade usages, but thought that they were only persuasive and not
instructions to be used for delivery. These sacks did not conform with the technical rules
of the Ukrainian chemical industry, and the supplier could not make use of them leading
to the goods not being delivered within the time fixed in the contract. The buyer wanted
to avoid the contract in respect of goods not delivered and asked the seller when it
expected to deliver. The seller's reply was not satisfactory and the buyer had to make a
substitute purchase at a higher price to be able to perform the contract with the third
party. The buyer commenced arbitral proceedings demanding damages, including the
cost of the sacks it had supplied as well as the loss deriving from the substitute purchase.
216. Article 7.4.9 (Interest for failure to pay money):
(1) If a party does not pay a sum of money when it falls due the
aggrieved party is entitled to interest upon that sum from the time
when payment is due to the time of payment whether or not the
non-payment is excused.
(2) The rate of interest shall be the average bank short-term lending
rate to prime borrowers prevailing for the currency of payment at
the place for payment, or where no such rate exists at that place,
then the same rate in the State of the currency of payment. In the
absence of such a rate at either place the rate of interest shall be
the appropriate rate fixed by the law of the State of the currency
of payment.
(3) The aggrieved party is entitled to additional damages if the non-
payment caused it a greater harm.
UNIDROIT, supra note 182.
217. Case 9474, Bank Notes Contract Case (ICC ICArb., Paris 1999), available at
UNILEX on UNIDROIT, supra note 192. This case was decided in 1999.
320
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mandatory as they were not incorporated in the agreement between the
parties.21 8
The PECL have been referred to in decisions as far away as Australia.
In GEC Marconi Systems Ltd. v BHP Information Technology Ltd.,219
the court ruled that "the duty of good faith and fair dealing was to be
considered an implied term of all contracts," relying on such expressions
in the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL, despite the absence of such
a rule in Australian law, and the "fact that the contract contained a
"entire agreement" clause was not sufficient to preclude such an
implication., 220 This joint reference to the UNIDROIT Principles and
the PECL is probably the forerunner of things to come as more tribunals
use these instruments at the interstices of positive law. They have the
great virtue of clear expression and embody a synthesis of international
legal rules in a way that promotes dispute resolution.
V. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that international commercial parties have little
patience with such ideas as state sovereignty. They demand laws to
facilitate their transactions, and if states are loath to do so in a timely
fashion, have not been hesitant to create international commercial law
using "soft law" instruments that in actuality have even more potency
than "hard law." This is no doubt because international commercial
disputes seldom require adjudication by the courts, and arbitral tribunals
are less concerned with notions of sovereignty when they are fashioning
relief that makes commercial sense. There is nothing that nation states
need to worry about: they are not particularly competent to address the
complexities of international commerce, and given their crowded
dockets, should welcome this trend by supporting the use of soft law
wherever possible. This paper has clearly shown the very limited role
played by nation states in the creation of modern international
commercial law: all the initiatives examined in the above pages involve
international agencies, regional agencies, inter-governmental agencies,
groups of scholars, and international arbitrators. Representatives of
218. Case 10022, Cement Contract Case (ICC ICArb. 2000), available at UNILEX
on UNIDROIT, supra note 192.
219. Case NG733 of 1997, GEC Marconi Sys. Pty Ltd. v. BHP Info. Tech Pty Ltd.
(Fed. Ct. Austl. 2003), available at UNILEX on UNIDROIT, supra note 192.
220. Id. (referring to article 1.7 of the UNIDROIT Principles and article 1:201 of
the PECL).
governments have been pushed to the background. This is only a herald
of things to come. Nation states do not appear to understand the
demands of modern international commerce, and if they can't take the
heat, they should get out of the kitchen.
